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WHEN DOES THE "FAT LADY" SING?': AN
ANALYSIS OF "AGREEMENTS IN
PRINCIPLE" IN CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS
HAR VEY L. TEMKIN *
INTRODUCTION
C ORPORATE acquisitions between two financial giants involving
hundreds of millions and sometimes even billions of dollars fre-
quently occur today.2 Such transactions are reported in newspapers,
over the media, in business periodicals and the like.3 Frequently, the
press release announcing such an event indicates that the parties have
reached either an "agreement in principle," where the parties contem-
plate ultimately negotiating and entering into a definitive agreement, or a
definitive agreement. The "agreement in principle" may be based on a
handshake understanding or memorialized in a preliminary letter of
intent.4
* Attorney, Foley & Lardner, Madison, Wisconsin; 1983-86, Associate Professor of
Law, Tulane University; B.A. 1974, University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1978, University of
Illinois. The author thanks his former colleagues, Professors Thomas J. Andre, Jr., John
Dzienkowski, and John Stick for their helpful comments and insights. The author also
thanks Jim Shephard (Tulane 1986) for his excellent research work and for his cheerful
encouragement.
1. Although this phrase probably originated in the opera setting, one of its more
interesting uses occurred in the battle between Pennzoil and Texaco for the Getty Oil
Company. When Texaco's Chairman, John K. McKinely, asked Getty Oil's Chairman
Sidney Peterson whether Getty might still be available even though an "agreement in
principle" had been entered into with Pennzoil, Peterson responded that "the fat lady
had not yet sung." Pennzoil Co. v. Getty Oil Co., No. 7425, slip op. at 46 (Del. Ch. Feb.
6, 1984). For a further discussion of the Texaco-Pennzoil case, see infra text
accompanying notes 60 to 63.
2. In 1984 alone, over 2,500 corporate mergers and acquisitions occurred with a
combined value of over 122 billion dollars. Work & Seamonds, What are Mergers Doing
to America?, 99 U.S. News & World Rep. 48 (July 22, 1985). Some of the more notable
1984 mergers and acquisitions included Texaco's purchase of Getty Oil, Allied Chemi-
cal's purchase of Bendix Corporation and 39 percent of Martin Marietta, Chevron's
purchase of Gulf Oil, and General Motor's purchase of Hughes Aircraft and Electronic
Data Systems. Id. at 48-49. In 1985, some of the more well-publicized mergers included
General Electric's takeover of RCA, Capital City Communication's purchase of ABC
and Kohlberg Kravis' buy-out of Beatrice. Although 1986 started by showing some
slowdown in the mergers and acquisitions area, the Sperry-Burroughs merger, Northwest
Airline's takeover of Republic Airlines and Texas Air's takeover of Eastern Airlines were
among a few of the transactions which continued to garner headlines. As the year con-
cluded, activity in the corporate acquisition area increased, presumably in anticipation of
implementation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
3. See infra note 70.
4. A related issue is when disclosure of merger negotiations is required in order to
comply with the federal securities laws. Although the law is by no means wholly free
from doubt, it seems clear that by the time an "agreement in principle" has been reached,
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After announcing the transaction, an issue that commonly arises con-
cerns the enforceability of the agreement. The most common issue is
whether the "agreement in principle" constitutes a binding and enforcea-
ble contract, or rather, is an unenforceable "agreement to agree."5 If the
parties have entered into a definitive agreement, the enforceability of the
agreement often depends on whether the selling entity's board of direc-
tors can bind the corporation prior to shareholder approval. 6 For exam-
ple, the question of the enforceability of the definitive agreement arises
when the selling entity receives a more attractive offer after its board of
directors has approved the definitive agreement, but prior to shareholder
approval.7
an announcement which is not misleading and which does not contain any material omis-
sions is required. See Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F. 2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986). For recent developments concerning when disclosure
of merger negotiations is required under the securities laws, see Levinson v. Basic, Inc.,
786 F. 2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3569 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1987) (No.
86-279); Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1215 (1984); In re Revlon, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-23320, [Current Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) f 84,006 (June 16, 1986); In re Carnation Co., Ex-
change Act Release No. 22,214 [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,801 (July 8, 1985); L. Solomon, Corporate Acquisitions, Mergers & Divestitures,
70,120, 73,730 (Prentice Hall 1983 & Supp. 1985); Brodsky, Disclosure of Merger Negoti-
ations, N.Y.L.J. July 2, 1986, at 1, col. 1. See also Bloomenthal, Materiality of Prelini-
nary Merger Negotiations (Part I), 8 Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep. 129 (1986); Klein,
Disclosure of Merger Negotiations, 19 Rev. Sec. & Comm. Reg. 8 (1986); Note, Corporate
Disclosure of Merger Negotiations- When Does the Investor Have a Right to Know?, 36
Syracuse L. Rev. 1155 (1985).
5. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts, at 51 (2d ed. 1977); E. Farnsworth, Con-
tracts, 202-04 (1982). Recently, however, there has been some recognition of the com-
mercial need for agreements to agree. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra, at 51; E.
Farnsworth, supra, at 204. Both the U.C.C. and the Restatement state that agreements
to agree, even on material terms, are not necessarily too indefinite to enforce. See Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts § 33 at 92-97 (1981); U.C.C. §§ 2-204(3) and official
comment, 2-305(1)(b) (1977).
6. State law usually requires approval by the boards of directors of both of the in-
volved entities. See, e.g., Revised Model Business Corp. Act [hereinafter MBCA]
§§ 11.01(a), 12.02(b) (1985); Cal. Corp. Code Sections 1001(a)(l), 1101 (West 1977 &
Supp. 1986); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 251(b), 271(a) (1975); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§§ 902, 909(a)(1) (McKinney 1986).
Even in a friendly takeover situation, most states require shareholder approval by at
least the selling entity's shareholders. See, e.g., MBCA Sections 11.03, 12.02 (1985); Cal.
Corp. Code §§ 1001 (a)(1), 1101 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986); Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8,
§§ 251(b), 271(a) (1975); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 902, 909(a)(1) (MeKinney 1986).
7. This Article will not address the fiduciary duties owed by corporate management
and the corporation's board of directors to its shareholders. Suffice it to say that, over the
past few years, the fiduciary duties owed by management and directors when a corporate
acquisition is at issue has received a considerable amount of attention both from the
courts and from legal scholars. For a sampling of some of the more important recent
court decisions in this area, see Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781
F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that target corporation's directors did not exercise their
proper business judgment in granting a lock-up option of substantial target company
assets to Merrill Lynch in an attempt to fend off hostile tender offer); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (holding that target
corporation's directors breached fiduciary duty in granting lock-up option to defeat hos-
AGREEMENTS IN PRINCIPLE
This Article focuses primarily on the contractual issues resulting from
the "agreement in principle."' In most cases, courts have espoused the
notion that their major focus is effectuating the parties' intent.' This Ar-
ticle contends, however, that courts have not focused on the probable
expectation of the parties in determining whether a binding and enforcea-
ble contract has arisen at the "agreement in principle" stage. Rather,
courts have generally used an "all or nothing" approach.' ° Under this
approach, courts determine either that the parties have entered into a
contract to consummate the transaction or that no contract exists."
This Article suggests that, instead of limiting the inquiry to an all or
nothing determination, courts should recognize three separate categories
of situations involving corporate acquisitions in order to determine more
accurately the parties' relationship.' 2
In the first category, the parties do not yet intend to have any contrac-
tile offer and further holding that, once target's board realized that company's break-up
was inevitable, directors took on the role of auctioneers, trying to get best price for its
shareholders); Moran v. Household Int'l., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (upholding direc-
tors' action in adopting "poison pill" preferred stock rights dividend plan); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding target corporation's directors liable for
breaching fiduciary duty in approving Marmon Group's $55 per share offer for shares of
TransUnion Corporation).
8. Throughout this Article, the term "agreement in principle" will be used to de-
scribe a situation in which the parties have agreed on the basic terms of the transaction,
including price and general structure but still contemplate negotiating and entering into a
definitive agreement detailing the complete terms of the transaction.
9. See, eg., Channel Home Centers v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291, 299 (3d Cir. 1986);
Winston v. Mediafare Entertainment Corp., 777 F.2d 78, 80 (2d Cir. 1985); R.G. Group,
Inc. v. Horn & Hardart, Co., 751 F.2d 69, 74 (2d Cir. 1984); Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM
Corp., 727 F.2d 257, 261 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984); V'Soske v.
Barwick, 404 F.2d 495,499 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969); Melo-Sonics
Corp. v. Cropp., 342 F.2d 856, 859 (3d Cir. 1965); Banking & Trading Corp. v. Floete,
257 F.2d 765, 769 (2d Cir. 1958); Garner v. Boyd, 330 F. Supp. 22, 25-26 (N.D. Tex.
1970), aff'd, 447 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1971); Continental Fin. Servs. v. First Nat'l Bank of
Boston Corp., No. 82-1505-T, slip. op. at 6 (D. Mass. Aug. 30, 1984); Metropolitan Life
Ins. v. Calumet Fed. Savings & Loan, No. 78-6-3728, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11,
1982).
10. See Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 673, 719
(1969). See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 40-66 and accompanying text.
12. Discussing generally the concept of an "all or nothing" approach in contract law,
Fuller and Perdue stated:
Though the all-or-nothing approach may be harsh, it at least allows a man to
know where he stands. This comforting supposition can be preserved only so
long as one ignores the psychological realities of the judicial process. In fact,
more often than not, the all-or-nothing theory introduces stresses (and with
them, a fortuitous element) into the process of decision which can be eliminated
only by the adoption of a more flexible scheme of legal sanctions.
The objection to the all-or-nothing attitude is not simply that it often results
in the plaintiff's getting all when apart would have made him whole. The more
serious objection is that in those cases where a court balks at giving him all, he
may get nothing when he urgently needed and deserved a part.
Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 Yale LJ. 373, 419-20
(1937) (footnotes omitted).
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tual relationship. They merely have conducted preliminary negotiations,
and each party has felt free to walk away from the discussions for any or
no reason. This stage occurs prior to the parties reaching an "agreement
in principle." Because the parties understand that they have engaged
only in preliminary talks and have not yet formulated an expectation that
the deal will ultimately be consummated, these clear-cut situations are
rarely the subject of litigation. The parties have neither a contract nor an
obligation to each other.
In the second category, the parties have entered into a definitive agree-
ment. In most of these cases, the parties feel that they have entered into
a binding contract. 13 Each party expects the transaction to close, and if
either party backs out of the deal, for reasons other than an inability to
satisfy one or more of the conditions that is normally contained in an
agreement of this nature, 4 the other party feels that the contract has
13. Despite the parties' intention that the definitive agreement is their complete agree-
ment spelling out all of the terms and conditions of their contractual obligations, courts
are still, split as to whether the target company can withdraw from the agreement with
impunity either because of the target's receipt of a higher offer or because of changed
circumstances. Compare ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 222 Neb. 136, 382 N.W. 2d 576
(1986) (holding, under Delaware law, that target company's board had no statutory au-
thority to bind corporation to merger agreement without shareholder approval-direc-
tors' primary duty was to shareholders, despite directors' agreement to use their best
efforts to obtain shareholder approval) and Great Producers Coop. v. Great United
Corp., 200 Colo. 180, 187, 613 P.2d 873, 879 (1980) (holding, under Delaware law, that
directors of target company are not required to recommend shareholder approval of de-
finitive agreement where changed circumstances result in directors determining that con-
templated transaction is no longer in shareholders' best interests, even though directors
had agreed with acquiring entity to use "best efforts" to obtain shareholder approval) and
Smith v. Good Music Station, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 262, 265, 129 A.2d 242, 245 (1957) (letter
agreement containing offer to purchase corporate assets not binding until requisite statu-
tory approval obtained) and Masonic Temple, Inc. v. Ebert, 99 S.C. 5, 8-9, 18 S.E. 2d
584, 587-89 (1942) (court held defendant could withdraw offer to purchase company's
property made to company's officer or agent because there was no binding contract until
shareholders ratified) and Finklea v. Carolina Farms Co., 196 S.C. 466, 469, 13 S.E. 2d
596, 598-99 (1941) (court held no contract where plaintiff submitted offer to president
and attorney of company to purchase option to buy company's realty, but consent of
shareholders not obtained as required by law) with Jewel Companies v. Pay Less Drug
Stores Northwest, Inc., 741 F.2d 1555 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding, under California law,
that target company's board has authority to enter into exclusive merger agreement to
bind itself to forbear from negotiating or accepting competing offers until shareholders
have opportunity to consider the first proposal). See also Hart & Brodwin, Merger Agree-
ments in Takeover Contests, 17 Rev. Sec. Reg. 779 (1984) (courts split over enforceability
of target company's agreement to recommend merger to shareholders when director's
duty to recommend best available offer subsequently conflicts); Ward, The Legal Effect of
Merger and Asset Sale Agreements Before Shareholder Approval, 18 W. Res. L. Rev. 780
(1967) (suggesting that uncertainty of legal effect of board of directors' merger sale agree-
ments due to common law rule requiring shareholder approval be clarified by statutory
amendment); Brodsky, When is a Merger Agreement Binding?, 195 N.Y.L.J., No. 26, at
1, col. 1 (Aug. 6, 1986).
14. Even in situations where a definitive agreement has been reached, the consumma-
tion of the transaction frequently will be conditioned on various matters, including ob-
taining shareholder approval in those situations where shareholder approval is either
required by statute or is otherwise sought; obtaining any necessary antitrust clearance;
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been breached, entitling the non-breaching party to a remedy.
The third category, in the middle of these extremes, is the subject of
this Article and is the most problematic. Here, the parties' negotiations
have proceeded beyond the preliminary stage. 5 This is normally the situ-
ation where the parties have reached an "agreement in principle," which
typically spells out the price and outlines the general structure of the
transaction, but often conditions the parties' obligation to consummate
the transaction on their working out the terms of a definitive agree-
ment.' 6 The "agreement in principle" may be based on a handshake un-
derstanding"7 or reflected in either a preliminary memorandum of
understanding or a letter of intent.' 8 At this point, each party has a clear
understanding that negotiations have progressed beyond the mere discus-
sion stage. They have soqne expectation that an ultimate agreement to
obtaining other required regulatory approvals; obtaining the consent of other necessary
parties such as major creditors; securing financing for the transaction; and the absence of
an injunction issued to prohibit the transaction. See infra notes 129-37 and accompany-
ing text. See supra notes 6 and 135 and accompanying text.
15. Professor Knapp notes the different views parties may have at this stage of the
negotiating process. First, the parties may think that they are not bound unless and until
a formal writing is signed. They may think that they can refuse to sign the writing for
any reason. As Professor Knapp indicates, this type of thinking may occur in situations
where the contract has to be in writing, involves large sums of money, is very detailed and
is not one for which there is a standard form. The second view that the parties may have
is that the final document is a mere formality. This situation might arise where a simple
transaction, not involving long-term obligations, is involved. The third view that the
parties may have is that they have taken the transaction as far as they can and it is now
left to the lawyers and accountants to formalize the agreement.
[T]he principals are likely to feel ethically bound to the outlines of the deal as
they have hammered it out, the withdrawal of either one based simply on dissat-
isfaction with those outlines being regarded by both as admittedly unjustified.
The principals, however, are likely to consider themselves still morally free to
withdraw if and when it should appear that the 'second team' of bargainers
have raised a substantial issue on which they are unable to agree and which the
principals, when apprised of the difficulty, are likewise unable to resolve.
Knapp, supra note 10, at 684.
16. This contemplation of entering into a definitive agreement is often referred to as
an "agreement to agree." See 1 A. Corbin, Corbin On Contracts § 30, at 98-99 (2d ed.
1963). See also infra note 38, which notes the distinction between the "agreement to
agree" and the "formal contract contemplated" situations.
17. Even where the reference is to a handshake agreement, typically there is some
writing between the parties. See Melo-Sonics Corp. v. Cropp, 342 F.2d 856, 860 (3d Cir.
1965); J. Freund, Anatomy of a Merger: Strategies and Techniques for Negotiating Cor-
porate Acquisitions, 126 (1975).
18. Merely terming a document a letter of intent will not be conclusive as to how a
court will construe the document. For example, if the document does not clearly and
unequivocally indicate that no binding obligations are to arise until a definitive agreement
has been reached, a court might look at the intent of the parties and find that the letter of
intent constitutes a binding contract. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 5. § 2-7, at 30-
33. As to the risks that are created when the parties enter into a letter of intent, see Volk,
The Letter of Intent, 16 Inst. on Sec. Reg. 143, 145 (1985) (indicating that announcement
of a letter of intent puts the company on the auction block and "is a little bit like an-
nouncing what you think is an engagement to marry a lovely lady and have it be treated
in the market place as if the lady were not engaged but available").
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consummate the transaction will be reached. 9 The parties are aware,
however, that a definitive agreement still must be negotiated. Neverthe-
less, while each party feels that either can walk away from the transac-
tion, each is also likely to feel that there should be some justifiable good
faith reason for doing so.
Through using the "all or nothing" approach, courts, for the most
part, have not considered the "agreement in principle" cases as a sepa-
rate category. Thus, the commercial expectations of the parties at the
middle "agreement in principle" stage are often ignored, creating an in-
equitable and an inefficient situation. Some courts have permitted parties
to an "agreement in principle" to withdraw in bad faith from negotia-
tions, either for no reason or perhaps because of a higher offer from an-
other party."z On the other hand, some courts have held the
withdrawing party liable as if a fully negotiated contract to consummate
the transaction already existed.2' The inequity of this result is evidenced
by the multi-billion dollar jury verdict in Texaco-Pennzoil,22 a decision
which will be referred to throughout this Article. Neither extreme is
likely to reflect what the parties thought they were agreeing to when they
entered into the "agreement in principle." In addition, the "all or noth-
ing" approach has created inefficiencies because negotiators are uncertain
of whether a court will construe their negotiations as a final contract
resulting in full expectation liability.23
This Article will explore different approaches in determining the en-
forceability of an "agreement in principle." Part I analyzes the tradi-
tional approach used by the courts. Part II discusses alternative
approaches: use of promissory estoppel or enforcement of an obligation
19. This agreement is the "contract to bargain" that Professor Knapp discusses in his
Article. See Knapp, supra note 10, at 685-86.
20. See, e.g., Belcher v. Import Cars, Ltd., 246 So. 2d 584 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 252 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1971) (reversing trial court and adopting appellant's argu-
ment that letter agreement, which was quite detailed, did not constitute a contract);
Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. Shawd, 352 Mich. 453, 90 N.W.2d 451 (1958) (concluding
that lower court was justified in finding no enforceable contract where the parties clearly
intended to finalize their oral agreement in a formal written document).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 40-67.
22. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., No. 01-86-00216-CV (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1987)
(LEXIS, States library, Tex file). In discussing Texaco-Pennzoil and the earlier decisions
by the Delaware Chancery Court involving motions for a temporary restraining order
and then summary judgment, one commentator stated that the case presents "an unusual
situation, in terms of its notoriety. But, when you review the cases in this area, you will
see that the Getty decision is par for the course. The cases are all 'over the board.' "
Volk, The Letter of Intent, supra note 18, at 145. See also Volk & McMahon, Letter of
Intent-Getty and Beyond, 16 Inst. on Sec. Reg. (Vol. 1) 445, at 445 (1984).
23. As later discussed in this Article, although it is relatively easy to articulate how
courts have reached questionable conclusions and why their decisions in this area have
been so inconsistent, it is more difficult to determine whether either party has negotiated
in bad faith, and then to construct a proper remedy for that breach. Perhaps courts have
refused to enforce "agreements in principle" because of the difficulty in formulating an
appropriate remedy for the breach that did occur. For a proposal as to how courts might
formulate such a remedy, see infra text accompanying notes 179-81.
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to negotiate in good faith as a mutually binding contract. Part III dis-
cusses how damages should be determined. This Article concludes that
judicial recognition of a contractual duty to negotiate in good faith better
effectuates the intent of the parties in cases involving an "agreement in
principle."
I. THE TRADITIONAL "ALL OR NOTHING" APPROACH
A. Theory
Under the traditional "all or nothing" approach, courts focus on two
related concerns to determine whether the "agreement in principle" con-
stitutes a binding and enforceable contract: whether the parties intended
to be bound,24 and if so, whether the agreement is sufficiently definite to
be enforced.2" Nevertheless, once a court has determined that the parties
intended to contract, it will attempt to enforce the agreement. Thus, a
court will read enough terms into the agreement to provide sufficient def-
initeness if it can find a reasonably certain basis for providing an appro-
priate remedy.26
24. The question of whether the parties to a contract intended to be bound is a factual
one. As a result, decisions in this area appear inconsistent, and it is almost impossible to
tell in advance how a court or jury would decide any particular case. Because the deci-
sions are so heavily dependent on the facts, they may not be inconsistent, but may result
from no two cases presenting identical facts. In many cases the question may properly be
left to the jury. See 1 A. Corbin, supra note 16, § 30, at 105-09. See also Arnold Palmer
Golf Co. v. Fuqua Indus., 541 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1976) (reversing summary judgment for
the defendant and remanding case to trial court for determining whether parties intended
to be bound even though preliminary letter agreement provided for preparation of a de-
finitive agreement).
Because the results of these cases are seemingly unpredictable, planning becomes very
difficult. Even well-advised parties may be unable to determine whether a contract had
resulted from their actions. This uncertainty may cause the parties to be more reluctant
to enter into negotiations out of fear that they may find themselves embroiled in a lawsuit
if one party withdraws from the negotiations.
25. The Uniform Commercial Code provides, for example, that "[e]ven though one or
more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties
have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an
appropriate remedy." U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1978). Although Article 2 may not apply to a
merger transaction because it does not involve a contract for the sale of goods under §§ 2-
105 and 2-106 of the U.C.C., the same general principle concerning the enforceability of a
merger agreement may well be applied by a court in this context. See Gruen Indus. v.
Biller, 608 F.2d 274, 278 n.2 (7th Cir. 1979) (in cause of action for alleged breach of
contract to sell stock, court accepted plaintiff's argument that although Article 8 of the
UCC (governing investment securities) contains no section on sales contract formation,
plaintiff could analogize to § 2-204 of the U.C.C.). See also, Pennsylvania Co. v. Wil-
mington Trust Co., 39 Del. Ch. 453, 166 A.2d 726 (1960), aff 'd in part, 40 Del. Ch. 1,
172 A.2d 63 (1961) (involving enforceability of letter of intent concerning stock acquisi-
tion in which court relied on Section 2-204(3) of the U.C.C.); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 33 (1981) (providing that "[t]he terms of a contract are reasonably certain if
they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropri-
ate remedy").
26. Once a court determines that the parties intended to contract, its goal will be to
find that the agreement is sufficiently definite and not allow it to fail for uncertainty,
although the court may have to consider relevant extrinsic evidence and use gap-fillers.
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To determine the parties' intent under the "all or nothing" approach,
courts generally rely on the objective theory of contract.2 7 The factors
on which courts focus to determine intent include the type of contract
involved, whether that type of contract is normally in writing or should
be in writing, the amount of money at issue in the transaction, any indi-
cation that the parties intended to be bound only by a written definitive
contract, and whether that contract is of a common or unusual type.28
The party resisting enforcement often contends that the preliminary
agreement does not satisfy the statute of frauds,29 the parties had not yet
See, e.g., Mid-Continent Tel. Corp. v. Home Tel. Co., 319 F. Supp. 1176, 1192 (N.D.
Miss. 1970).
27. Perhaps the most well-known articulation of the objective theory of contracts was
pronounced by Judge Learned Hand in Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293
(S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913), where he
stated:
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual,
intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of
law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany
and represent a known intent. If, however, it were proved by twenty bishops
that either party, when he used the words, intended something else than the
usual meaning which the law imposes upon them, he would still be held, unless
there were some mutual mistake, or something else of the sort.
28. See Mid-Continent Tel. Corp. v. Home Tel. Co., 319 F. Supp. 1176, 1189 (N.D.
Miss. 1970); Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. Shawd, 352 Mich. 453, 90 N.W.2d 451
(1958); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 27 comment c (1981); J. Calamari & J. Pe-
rillo, supra note 5, § 2-11, at 42; 1 A. Corbin, supra note 16, § 30 at 105-09; Volk &
McMahon, supra note 22, at 465.
Four factors are relevant under New York law in determining whether the parties
intended to be bound. They are:
(1) whether there has been an express reservation of the right not to be bound
in the absence of a writing; (2) whether there has been partial performance of
the contract; (3) whether all of the terms of the alleged contract have been
agreed upon; and (4) whether the agreement at issue is the type of contract that
is usually committed to writing.
Winston v. Mediafare Entertainment Corp., 777 F.2d 78, 80 (2d Cir. 1985) (citations
omitted). See also, R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 75-76 (2d Cir.
1984).
29. Although § 2-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code does not apply, § 8-319 of
the Code provides that
[a] contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by way of action or
defense unless there is some writing signed by the party against whom enforce-
ment is sought or by his authorized agent or broker, sufficient to indicate that a
contract has been made for sale of a stated quantity of described securities at a
defined or stated price.
U.C.C. § 8-319(a) (1978). Official comment 1 to § 8-319 states that "[tihis Section is
intended to conform the statute of frauds provisions with regard to securities to the policy
of the like provisions in Article 2." The comment notes, however, that § 8-319 does
require that the contract specify quantity and price. Even if a sale of securities is not
involved, § 1-206 provides that "a contract for the sale of personal property is not en-
forceable... beyond five thousand dollars in amount or value of remedy unless there is
some writing which indicates that a contract for sale has been made between the parties
at a defined or stated price, reasonably identifies the subject matter, and is signed by the
party against whom enforcement is sought."
Documents can be pieced together to form the necessary writing. Thus, a court could
hold that the statute of frauds is satisfied, even if the parties had not entered a definitive
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intended to reach a final agreement,3 0 and finally, even if the parties had
intended to agree, the agreement they reached was too indefinite to en-
force.3 1 The party favoring enforcement often argues that, under the ob-
jective theory of contract law, the manifestations of the parties would
indicate to a reasonable person that an agreement had been reached.32
Although the party may try to use a promissory estoppel theory, courts
generally have rejected the use of the doctrine in this situation. 3
By focusing on the above factors, courts can determine whether, under
traditional contract law principles, the parties have entered into an en-
forceable contract. Nevertheless, focusing on these factors may not effec-
tuate what the parties expected from their "agreement in principle." In
those cases where courts have enforced "agreements in principle" as
binding and enforceable contracts, three circumstances often recur.
First, in each of the cases, courts have found that the "agreement in prin-
ciple" was sufficiently complete because it contained the essential terms
of the contract.34 Thus, through use of gap-fillers3 5 and the implication
of a good faith duty 6 on each of the parties, a court could supply the
agreement, provided that they intended to contract and intended those documents to
reflect their agreement. See Levin v. Knight, 780 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1986); R.G. Group,
Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 1984); Pennzoil Co. v. Getty Oil
Co., No. 7425, slip op. at 33 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 1984). It should not be assumed, however,
that the statute of frauds argument is without merit. An impressive number of courts
have relied on the statute of frauds to refuse enforcement of preliminary agreements. See,
e.g., Gruen Indus. v. Biller, 608 F.2d 274, 277-80 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding insufficient
evidence of contract satisfying the statute of frauds where parties had not entered into
formal letter of intent); California Natural, Inc. v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 631 F. Supp.
465, 471 (D.N.J. 1986) (noting that under U.C.C. § 2-201 the writing must reasonably
prove existence of contract); Continental Fin. Servs. v. First Nat'l Boston Corp., No. 82-
1505-T, slip op. at 11 (D. Mass. Aug. 30, 1984) (finding no compliance with statute of
frauds where, although no formal letter of intent existed, there was correspondence back
and forth between parties concerning proposed transaction); Southeastern Waste Treat-
ment, Inc. v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., 506 F. Supp. 944, 949 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (holding that
letter of intent did not satisfy statute of frauds); Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Universal
Hous. Sys. of Am., 495 F. Supp. 544, 550-51 and n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 697 F.2d
289 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding that even if parties intended to form oral joint venture, it
would be barred by statute of frauds); Consolidated Petroleum Indus. v. Jacobs, 648 S.W.
2d 363, 366-67 (Tex. App. 1983) (finding that alleged agreement did not satisfy U.C.C.
§ 8-319 and the exceptions thereto).
30. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 25.
32. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 74-161.
34. See infra notes 40-64 and accompanying text.
35. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 204 (198 1) ("When the parties to a bar-
gain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a term which is
essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is reasonable in the
circumstances is supplied by the court."); U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1978) (providing that
"'[e]ven though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefi-
niteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain
basis for giving an appropriate remedy"); U.C.C. § 2-309(1) (1978) (providing that unless
otherwise agreed, the time for performance "shall be a reasonable time").
36. See Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good
Faith, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 369, 387 (1980) [hereinafter Burton 1] (-many of the contracts in
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missing terms to make the preliminary agreement sufficiently definite to
be enforced. Second, where the selling entity has withdrawn, it generally
has done so in order to sell to another at a higher price.3 7 Finally, the
parties contemplated negotiation of a definitive agreement or at least fur-
ther agreements between the parties.
Based on these three circumstances, courts have found themselves
caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, the "agreement in principle" is
sufficiently complete to be enforced, thus overcoming the indefiniteness
hurdle. On the other hand, because the parties conditioned any obliga-
tion they might have on the negotiation of a further agreement, perhaps
they intended their present "agreement in principle" to constitute an un-
enforceable "agreement to agree."38 As such, a court should not enforce
which good faith performance is of central importance once would have been unenforce-
able for indefiniteness or lack of mutuality"). See Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 205 (1981) ("Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in its performance and enforcement."). There is no counterpart to the good faith
provision in the original Restatement, and it has been suggested that the lack of such a
provision resulted from the lack of an affirmative good faith duty at common law.
Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good Faith Disclosure in Con-
tract Formation, 39 U. Pitt L. Rev. 381, 382 at n.3 (1978).
Professor Summers has noted that "the requirement of good faith often functions as a
kind of 'safety valve' which may be turned to fill gaps and qualify or limit rights and
duties arising under contracts or rules of law." Summers, "Good Faith" in General Con-
tract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 Va. L. Rev. 195,
215-16 (1968) [hereinafter Summers I]. By using gap fillers and reading into the contract
a good faith duty on each of the parties, a party would not have to fear that his counter-
part could withdraw from the contract with impunity simply because the parties had
neglected to include all terms. See D. Dobbs, Remedies § 12.3, at 798-817 (1973). Ar-
guably commerce is promoted because courts would be encouraging people to live up to
their promises and trust others. See, e.g., Farber & Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estop-
pel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake", 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 903, 928 (1985)
Because trust is essential to our basic economic institutions, it is a public good.
One individual breaking trust in a dramatic way, or many individuals breaking
trust less dramatically, can lead to short-run benefits for those individuals but
create negative externalities. The willingness of others to trust is impaired, re-
quiring them to invest in precautions or insure themselves against the increased
risk of betrayal.
Id.
37. The majority of litigated cases where the seller has withdrawn have occurred from
receipt of a better offer, as opposed to just because they decided to take the property off
the market. See, e.g., Melo-Sonics Corp. v. Cropp, 342 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1971); Tex-
aco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., No. 01-86-00216-CV (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1987) (LEXIS,
States library, Tex file); American Cyanamide Co. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 331 F.
Supp. 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). For some recent situations where the buyer has withdrawn,
see California Natural, Inc. v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 465 (D.N.J. 1986);
I.M.A. Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Airways, 713 P.2d 882 (Colo. 1986).
38. See J. Freund, supra note 17, at 61-62. There are really two separate types of
agreements to agree. The first type involves a situation where the agreement may not be
an enforceable contract because it is too indefinite. If the agreement is deficient as to
particular terms, a court may be able to enforce the agreement through its gap-filling
powers. The second type of "agreement to agree" is a "formal contract contemplated"
situation. The agreement may be complete enough to enforce, either because it contains
sufficiently definite terms or because a court could supply the requisite terms to overcome
the indefiniteness hurdle, but nevertheless the parties still contemplate entering into a
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the preliminary agreement as a contract to consummate the transaction
until finalization of the definitive agreement. Finally, the seller's with-
drawal from the transaction in order to accept a higher offer without
even an attempt to negotiate a definitive agreement is inequitable. 39
B. Case Law Application
Courts enforcing an "agreement in principle" have determined that if
it contains the essential terms of the transaction, it indicates that the
parties intended to be bound to consummate the transaction. 40 Yet this
formal contract. Here, the court's primary concern is not indefiniteness of the contract,
but whether the parties intended to have a court enforce their preliminary agreement as a
contract. See Knapp, supra note 10, at 677. Many of the cases this Article examines fall
into the latter category.
39. The issue may become whether we should view the buyer's and seller's obligation
as a legally binding promise or as a non-binding moral obligation. One author states that
it is simply right that one get what he was promised. This is not the place to
figure out why we enforce promises, but surely there is a reason beyond efficient
allocation of resources. The origins of enforcement may be religious, or religion
may have been used to achieve utility, but I think that today most people be-
lieve that one should stand by one's word.
Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies - Efficiency, Equity, and the Second
Restatement, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 111, 138 (1981).
The distinction between a moral obligation and a legal obligation has recently been
described as follows:
The areas of moral obligations and legal obligations are not coextensive. A
moral obligation is something we ought to do or refrain from doing. A moral
obligation that is not also a valid legal obligation can only be legitimately se-
cured by voluntary means. That is, one may have a moral obligation to do
something, but unless there is also a valid legal obligation, one cannot legiti-
mately be forced by another to do it. A moral obligation is only a legal obliga-
tion if it can be enforced by the use or threat of legal force. This added
dimension of force requires moral justification. The principle task of legal the-
ory, then, is to identify circumstances when legal enforcement is morally
justified.
Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contracts, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 296 (1986).
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes noted this dilemma many years ago stating: "Nowhere
is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest than in the law of con-
tract." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 462 (1897).
40. One claim frequently asserted by plaintiffs in "agreements in principle" cases
where a third party bidder has outbid the original bidder is that the third party has
tortiously interfered with the original bidder's contractual relations. In fact, the jury
verdict in Texaco-Pennzoil was based on a tortious interference with contract claim. Tex-
aco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., No. 01-86-00216-CV (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1987) (LEXIS,
States library, Tex file); see also Gruen Indus., Inc. v. Biller, 608 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.
1979); American Cyanamid Co. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 331 F. Supp. 597
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Mid-Continerit Tel. Corp. v. Home Tel. Co., 319 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D.
Miss. 1970); Consolidated Petroleum Indus. v. Jacobs, 648 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App.
1983). In order for an action based on such a tort to succeed, the parties first must have a
contract. Even in the absence of a contract, however, the plaintiff may assert a claim
based on the related tort of interference with a prospective economic advantage. In order
to find a party liable for the tort of interference with a prospective economic advantage, a
court must find "(1) intentional interference by the defendant, (2) with an economic ex-
pectancy of the plaintiff, (3) of which the defendant knew or should have known, (4)
resulting in the expectancy being lost, (5) and the plaintiff being damaged." Loewenstein.
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situation, in which the parties have conditioned the transaction on suc-
cessful negotiation of a definitive agreement, differs from the situation in
which the parties have reached a definitive agreement but merely failed
to include all terms in the writing. Courts enforcing an "agreement in
principle" based on its completeness, however, are treating the two situa-
tions in a similar manner.
Several cases illustrate how courts rely on the completeness of the pre-
liminary agreement4" to help determine the intent of the parties. Under
an "all or nothing" approach, these courts have enforced a preliminary
agreement as a contract to consummate the transaction. In Melo-Sonics
Corporation v. Cropp,42 the court considered a telegram from the defend-
ant's attorney providing that his clients were willing to sell their stock for
$1,500,000 "subject to formalizing a preliminary agreement along lines
previously discussed."43 After plaintiff's lawyer replied and accepted the
offer, the parties began negotiating the complete terms of the transaction.
Tender Offer Litigation and State Law, 63 N.C.L. Rev. 493, 499 (1985). Generally, until
a contract has been formed there is more room for permissible interference by an inter-
ested third party. See Belden Corp. v. InterNorth, Inc., 90 Ill. App. 3d 547, 552, 413
N.E.2d 98, 101 (1980); W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 129, at 994-97 (5th
Ed. 1984). But see, Dowling, A Contract Theory for a Complex Tort: Limiting Interfer-
ence with Contract Beyond the Unlawful Means Test, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 487, 510-12
(1986) (arguing that interference with business relations deserves stronger protection
than interference with contractual relations).
A court that finds that the parties had entered into a contract to negotiate in good
faith, rather than an agreement to consummate the transaction, should examine whether
a third party has interfered with the parties' relationship under the applicable tests for
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. By doing so, courts will not
be discouraging third parties from bidding for an entity merely because an "agreement in
principle" has been reached. This will enhance competition and may result in a higher
bid being received for the target entity. As later shown, the original bidder will be com-
pensated for losing the opportunity to purchase the target with damages based on the
harm it suffered by being out of the market in reliance on the target's implied promise to
negotiate in good faith. See infra text accompanying notes 96-98. That remedy should
normally be sufficient to compensate the original bidder so that no further remedy is
either necessary or appropriate.
41. Letters of intent, which normally contemplate the execution of a more formal
definitive agreement, may themselves contain a great deal of detail. See, e.g., Arnold
Palmer Golf Co. v. Fuqua Indus., 541 F.2d 584, 590-93 (6th Cir. 1976), where the court
attached the memorandum of intent to its opinion (letter of intent stated amount of stock
to be purchased, the price (including cash and stock), the conduct of the business, license
rights, stock options, warranties, etc.); see also Garner v. Boyd, 330 F. Supp. 22, 25-26
(N.D. Tex. 1970) (letter of intent contained all essential elements of a contract), aff'd,
447 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1971); Belcher v. Import Cars, Ltd., 246 So. 2d 584, 586 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 252 So. 2d 801 (1977) (although letter of intent contained
detailed formula to acquire all outstanding stock of company, court held parties did not
have contract because language was in future tense and condition precedent of purchaser
obtaining loan not met).
Courts that have enforced "agreements in principle" as binding contracts to consum-
mate the transaction have generally done so where the preliminary agreements contained
the essential terms. These cases can be categorized as "formal contract contemplated"
cases. See supra note 38.
42. 342 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1965).
43. Id. at 858.
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Negotiations continued for almost two months before the defendants no-
tified the plaintiff that they were withdrawing from the contemplated
transaction. The defendants then sold to a third party for $4,556,700."
In reversing the lower court's dismissal of the case, the court stated
that the issue of whether the parties had entered into a contract depended
on their intent, which should be decided by a trier of fact.45 The Melo-
Sonics court further stated that where the parties have agreed on all the
essential terms and must only formalize the definitive agreement, the pre-
liminary agreement is sufficiently definite to be enforced as a contract.46'
A number of courts have adhered to the Melo-Sonics rationale.47 In
American Cyanamid Co. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. ,48 the court held
that a four page preliminary letter had terms sufficiently definite to en-
force as a final contract since it contained the essential elements with
respect to the subject matter required for a contract.49 The lack of cer-
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 859-60.
47. See Arnold Palmer Golf Co. v. Fuqua Indus., 541 F.2d 584, 589 (6th Cir. 1976)
(remanding case to lower court for determination of parties' intent when they entered
into preliminary letter of intent; court noted that parties may orally or by informal mem-
orandum agree on all essential terms of contract and bind themselves if that is their
intention, even though they contemplate subsequently executing formal document to me-
morialize their undertaking); Garner v. Boyd, 330 F. Supp. 22, 25-26 (N.D. Tex. 1970)
(holding that since the minds of the parties had met on all essential terms of contract,
letter of intent actually constituted a contract), aff'd, 447 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1971);
I.M.A., Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc., 713 P.2d 882, 885-87 (Colo. 1986) (en
banc) (affirming jury's verdict enforcing contract and awarding damages to non-breach-
ing seller where operative writing provided that it was "'preliminary in nature, and...
each party will work toward more definitive statements and the execution of agreements
and resolutions and contracts' "); Borg-Warner Corp. v. Anchor Coupling Co., 16 111. 2d
234, 243-44, 156 N.E. 2d 513, 517 (1958) (holding that if parties intended a general ac-
ceptance by plaintiff to complete the contract, the contract could be enforceable even if
parties agree to contract concerning additional matters). But see Citizens Utils. Co. v.
Wheeler, 156 Cal. App. 2d 423, 319 P.2d 763, 765 (1958) (affirming trial court's finding
that no contract existed where price terms in memorandum of agreement were so vague
as to be wholly unascertainable); Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. Shawd, 352 Mich. 453,
462, 90 N.W.2d 451, 456 (1958) (finding no enforceable contract where negotiations were
complex, and a written agreement was proposed, referred to and suggested by the par-
ties).
The comments to the Restatement (Second) provide that the parties may make a con-
tract which includes an obligation that they will subsequently execute a final writing
containing certain provisions. Those comments state that if the "parties have definitely
agreed that they will do so, and that the final writing shall contain these pro% isions and
no others, they have then concluded the contract." Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 27 comment a, at 78 (1981).
48. 331 F. Supp. 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Arden was attempting to withdrawv after re-
ceiving a higher bid. See id. at 601.
49. The preliminary letter agreement stated:
The consummation of such acquisition is conditioned upon the execution of a
mutually satisfactory purchase agreement and, on the part of Cyanamid. the
approval of its board of directors. It is understood that. if either Cyanamid or
Elizabeth Arden is unable to reach such agreement or to obtain such approval.
neither party shall have any obligation to the other.
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tain terms in the letter did not dissuade the court. Rather, the court
judicially supplied the missing terms, such as the closing date and the
date for signing the formal agreement." Similarly, in V'Soske v. Bar-
wick,5' the court rejected the argument that no contract had yet arisen
because the parties had left too many terms unsettled in the initial agree-
ments. In V'Soske, the parties had not only exchanged correspondence,
resulting in an "agreement in principle," they also began procedures for
consummating the transaction, including drafting and negotiating the
formal written agreement.5 2 The court found that the terms contained in
the parties' initial offer and counter-offers sufficiently detailed the terms
of their agreement to constitute an enforceable contract.53
In Mid-Continent Telephone Corp. v. Home Telephone Co., 4 the court
considered the enforceability of a letter agreement executed by both par-
ties that stated that its purpose was "to put in writing the terms and
conditions of an agreement that we would propose to enter into."55 Even
though the letter agreement contained conditions concerning a number
of different matters, including the development of "a mutually satisfac-
tory arrangement for the continued employment of certain management
personnel,",5 6 the court found it enforceable. On that basis, the court
held Home Telephone liable for damages which Mid-Continent sustained
as a result of Home Telephone's withdrawal. The Home Telephone court
Id. at 602 n.3.
50. Id. at 603-04. The court was troubled, however, that the letter of intent provided
that consummation of the transaction was contingent on the approval of Cyanamid's
directors. As a result, it denied Cyanamid's motion for summary judgment, finding that
an issue existed as to whether the letter agreement constituted an option irrevocable for a
reasonable time, the acceptance of which would occur when Cyanamid's board approved
the transaction. Id. at 605-06. In connection with whether a letter of intent that might
otherwise be enforceable is binding pending board of director approval, see Pennsylvania
Co. v.Wilmington Trust Co., 40 Del. Ch. 567, 572, 186 A.2d 751, 754 (1962) (court noted
that "even if the April 15 agreements were intended to be binding before the execution of
this implementing agreement, it is nevertheless tacitly conceded that such agreements
were not binding between the parties thereto prior to approval by the respective boards of
the purchasing railroads . . ."), aff'd, 41 Del. Ch. 548, 200 A.2d 441 (1964). For a
discussion of the problems that can arise in connection with an officer signing a letter of
intent without board approval, see A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium for Special-
praeparater v. I.M.C. Chem. Group, Inc., No. 78-C-2872, slip op. (N.D. I1. Aug. 26,
1982), appeal dismissed, 725 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1984), on remand, No. 78-C-2872, slip
op. (N.D. Ill. July 17, 1985). See also Note, Board of Directors Approval Clauses in Cor-
porate Contracts: The Duty of Good Faith, J. Corp. L. 931 (Summer 1984).
51. 404 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969).
52. Id. at 498.
53. The V'Soske court noted that the parties' intention to memorialize their agree-
ment in a formal document does not prevent their informal agreement from taking effect
prior to entering the formal agreement. See id. at 499.
54. 319 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Miss. 1970).
55. Id. at 1183.
56. Id. at n.3. In fact, the reference to retention of certain management personnel
related to an employment agreement being reached between Mid-Continent and Rex
Darley, who was the son of Lon Darley, Home Telephone's principal shareholder. Id. at
1184.
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rejected the argument that a contract is unenforceable because some
terms are left open for future agreement of the parties." The court em-
phasized that its primary focus in determining the contract's enforceabil-
ity was the parties' intent.58 Nevertheless, the court stated that where
the parties have agreed on all substantial terms of the contract, that the
parties contemplate entering into a final agreement does not make the
preliminary agreement unenforceable absent a definite intent that the
agreement should not be binding until execution of the final document.59
Finally, the most dramatic example is the recent jury verdict in
Texaco-Pennzoil6' involving the battle for the Getty Oil Company. The
jury returned a $10.53 billion verdict against Texaco 6 based on its find-
ing that the Getty Oil Company, the Sarah C. Getty Trust, which at the
time controlled about 40.2% of the Getty Oil stock, and the J. Paul
Getty Museum, which controlled about 11.8% of that stock, had entered
into a binding agreement with Pennzoil pursuant to which Pennzoil was
to become a three-sevenths owner of Getty Oil. The jury found that the
"agreement in principle" between the parties was binding even though no
definitive agreements had been reached,62 and even though the parties
57. The court stated:
[T]he law favors a determination that an agreement is sufficiently definite and
will not allow a contract to fail for uncertainty 'if it contains matter which will
enable the court under proper rules of construction to ascertain its terms, in-
cluding consideration of the general circumstances of the parties and if neces-
sary relevant extrinsic evidence.' Once the court has found that a contract was
made, the agreement should not be frustrated where it is possible to reach a fair
and just result, 'even though this requires a choice among conflicting meanings
and the filling of some gaps that the parties have left.'
In the final analysis, a contract becomes enforceable against the objection of
apparent uncertainty and indefiniteness when a court is able to determine as a
fact that the agreement is complete by resorting to objective external standards,
or commercial practice, or other usage or custom fairly shown to be within the
contemplation of the parties."
319 F. Supp. at 1192 (citations omitted) (quoting Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 95, at
400).
58. Id.
59. Although the court did not rely on a separate duty to negotiate in good faith in
enforcing the letter agreement, the Home Telephone decision easily could be explained on
such a basis. See infra note 153.
60. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., No. 01-86-00216-CV (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1987)
(LEXIS, States library, Tex file).
61. The judgment entered in favor of Pennzoil on December 10. 1985, in the state
trial court totalled S11.12 billion, including prejudgment interest. The jury's S10.53 bil-
lion judgment included an award of $7.53 billion in compensatory damages and S3 billion
in punitive damages. Brief for Appellant at 10, Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co. (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986) (No. 01-86-00216-CV). The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the S7.53 bil-
lion compensatory award and reduced the amount of punitive damages to SI billion.
Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., No. 01-86-00216-CV (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 12. 1987) (LEXIS.
States library, Tex file).
62. Pennzoil had prepared a five-page single-spaced Memorandum of Agreement
which was signed by Gordon Getty, as sole trustee of the Sarah C. Getty Trust. Harold
Williams, as President of the J. Paul Getty Museum and by Hugh Liedtke. Pennzoil's
Chairman. That Memorandum of Agreement spelled out in considerable detail the terms
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contemplated negotiating and entering into such agreements. 63
In these cases, the court was confronted with the three circumstances
noted above:' first, the parties had agreed on the essential terms of the
proposed transaction; second, the parties still contemplated negotiating
and entering into further agreements spelling out all of the terms and
conditions of their arrangement; and in each case where the seller had
withdrawn, it had done so in order to sell to a third party at a higher
price.
By using the "all or nothing" approach, courts treat "agreements in
principle" as either creating a binding and enforceable contract to con-
summate the transaction, or as creating no obligation whatsoever. Clas-
sic black-letter law holds that an "agreement to agree" is no agreement.65
Yet, in each of the cases discussed, the parties had agreed on the essential
terms of the transaction. Additionally, the breaching party often with-
drew only because someone else offered a better price. Although many
courts have concluded that an "agreement in principle" constitutes an
unenforceable "agreement to agree,"66 other courts have apparently rec-
ognized the inequity of the situation and found that the "agreement in
principle" evidences an agreement sufficiently complete to warrant en-
forcement as a contract to consummate the transaction.67
of the transaction and provided for approval by the Getty Oil board. After lengthy meet-
ings and negotiations, the Getty board rejected the terms of the transaction as spelled out
in that memorandum. Ultimately, Pennzoil and the Getty Oil board agreed on a propo-
sal that contained some revised, and from Getty's standpoint, improved terms. Although
the Getty board clearly voted to reject the terms of the initial Memorandum of Agree-
ment, at the trial there was conflicting testimony as to whether the Getty board ever
voted on approving the Memorandum of Agreement with revised terms. Brief for Appel-
lant at 12, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co. (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (No. 01-86-00216-CV).
63. After entering into the "agreement in principle," Getty Oil, Gordon Getty, and
the Museum issued a press release on January 4, 1984, indicating that an "agreement in
principle" had been reached but that consummation of the transaction was subject to
execution of a definitive agreement.
Under the "agreement in principle," Gordon Getty and Pennzoil were to take Getty
Oil "private" by buying out the Museum's interest and buying out the public sharehold-
ers with the result that Pennzoil and the Sarah C. Getty Trust would jointly own Getty
Oil. Pennzoil was to own three-sevenths of the firm and the Trust was to own the re-
maining four-sevenths with Gordon Getty being named chairman of the new entity. Tex-
aco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., No. 01-86-00216-CV (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1987) (LEXIS,
States library, Tex file).
64. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
66. See Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d 257, 261 (2d Cir.), cert. denied.
469 U.S. 828 (1984); Arnold Palmer Golf Co. v. Fuqua Indus. Inc., 541 F.2d 584. 587
(6th Cir. 1976); United Acquisition Corp. v. Banque Paribas, 631 F. Supp. 797, 808
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Pepsico. Inc. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 307 F. Supp 713, 719 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Interway, Inc. v. Alagna, 85 II1. App. 3d 1094, 1099-100, 407 N.E. 2d 615. 619-20
(1980); Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. Shawd, 352 Mich. 453, 462, 90 N.W.2d 451. 456
(1958).
67. See supra notes 21 & 72-73 and accompanying text.
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II. A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE "ALL OR NOTHING" PROBLEM
A. Determining the Parties' True Intent
As discussed in Part I, one of the arguments advanced in favor of find-
ing liability is that courts should attempt to effectuate the intent of the
parties. Some courts have assumed that even in the absence of a defini-
tive agreement, the parties intended to be bound to consummate the
transaction. In transactions of the magnitude involved in the corporate
acquisition setting, however, a court inferring such an intent at the
"agreement in principle" stage will generally not effectuate the parties'
true commercial expectations. Even if the "agreement in principle" con-
tains the essential terms, because of the complexity of the transaction,
numerous substantive provisions remain for negotiation before the par-
ties would reach a definitive agreement. For example, the parties often
still will have to agree on such critical provisions as warranties and repre-
sentations, contract conditions, the scope of indemnifications, and some-
times non-competition clauses.
In a corporate acquisition situation, the parties involved are usually
sophisticated business people68 represented by able counsel. They realize
that a definitive agreement must still be concluded even after they have
reached an "agreement in principle."69 Admittedly, they are probably
assuming that the party on the other side of the bargaining table will
negotiate in good faith. Relying on that good faith, however, does not
mean that either of the negotiating parties is unaware of the possibility
that negotiations might break off.7° On the contrary, each party proba-
bly realizes that, until definitive documents are signed, the transaction
might not close. This is one reason why the parties are normally anxious
to draft, negotiate and finalize their agreement as soon as possible. Once
68. Some courts have specifically noted that the parties involved are sophisticated
business people and, thus, the situations presented do not involve cases where one party
with superior knowledge or expertise is able to take advantage of the other party. See,
e.g., Gruen Indus., Inc. v. Biller, 608 F.2d 274, 281 (7th Cir. 1979); Silberman v. Roethe,
64 Wis. 2d 131, 146, 218 N.W.2d 723, 730-31 (1974).
69. See Volk, supra note 18, at 144 (when parties involved in complex transaction and
specify their intent to subsequently enter into a formal binding contract, "'there should be
an inference that the parties have no intent to be bound in the absence of such an exe-
cuted final document.") See also, Volk & McMahon, supra note 22, at 471.
70. The impact of the Texaco-Pennzoil verdict as well as the uncertainty surrounding
the effect of an "agreement in principle" has had a noticeable impact on the negotiations
of corporate acquisitions. See Sterngold, Pennzoil Case Chills Advisers Firms Fear More
Suits, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1985, § D, at 4, col. 4; Waldman, Teraco-Pennzoil Case
Makes Firms More Careful About Merger Moves, Wall St. J., Apr. 15, 1986 at 1, col. 1.
See also Andresky, The Tripple Ripple Ice Cream Case, 138 Forbes 82 (Aug. 25, 1986)
("handshake agreement" enforceable as contract, similar to enforcement of Gety-
Pennzoil oral agreement). In the recent transaction where Texas Air agreed to take con-
trol of Eastern Airlines, Eastern's investment banker commented on the concern of both
parties that the contract be drafted sufficiently tight so that neither party could walk
away from the deal. See New Orleans Times-Picayune/States-Item, Feb. 27. 1986, § B,
at 2, col. 1; Texas Air Corp. 's Pact to buy Eastern Draws Rumors of Rival Bids for Airline.
Wall St. J., Feb. 26. 1986, at 4, col. I.
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those documents are completed, the parties finally feel that they have an
enforceable agreement which, assuming the conditions contained therein
are satisfied, will be consummated. 7
Assuming that the parties understand that a final definitive agreement
must still be reached, how do we deal with the dilemma created if one of
the parties withdraws in bad faith? For example, there would be some-
thing troublesome about letting the defendants in Melo-Sonics72 walk
away from the negotiating table in order to accept another offer yielding
three times the prior offer.73 Similarly, in Texaco-Pennzoil,74 it seems
unfair to permit one of the parties, while the attorneys are drafting final
documents based on the "agreement in principle," to withdraw from the
transaction with impunity simply because it has received a higher offer.7 5
The "all or nothing" approach does not provide a solution to the prob-
lem of one party withdrawing in bad faith from an "agreement in princi-
ple" since it forces courts to treat the preliminary agreement as either
creating a final and binding contract to consummate the transaction or as
creating no obligation whatsoever. If, however, at the "agreement in
principle" stage courts viewed the parties as having obligated themselves
to negotiate with one another in good faith to attempt to reach a defini-
tive agreement, courts could more closely effectuate their commercial ex-
pectations. Such an approach also permits tailoring a remedy that more
effectively compensates the injured party for breach of that good faith
duty.
71. But see discussion, supra at note 13, for situations where courts have refused to
enforce definitive agreements.
72. Melo-Sonics Corp. v. Cropp, 342 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1965).
73. Id. at 857-58. For another example of egregious conduct, see United Acquisition
Corp. v. Banque Paribas, 631 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The plaintiff verbally agreed
to purchase stock of a company which the defendant bank had acquired after the com-
pany defaulted on certain loans. Id. at 803. While the plaintiff was sitting in the defend-
ant's waiting room with a check to tender payment to purchase the stock, the defendant
was negotiating with the creditors' committee, which was trying to purchase the stock
despite awareness of plaintiff's offer. The defendant bank accepted the creditors' com-
mittee's higher offer, claiming that plaintiff had failed to transfer the funds to close the
deal. Id. at 803-04. In reality, it appears that the plaintiff's offer served as leverage to
squeeze a higher price and perhaps quicker action out of the creditors' committee.
74. Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., No. 01-86-00216-CV (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1987)
(LEXIS, States library, Tex file).
75. Id. As previously noted, supra at note 40, the Texaco-Pennzoil jury verdict was
based on a tortious interference with contract claim. The initial causes of action were
brought in Delaware against Getty Oil Co., Gordon P. Getty as Trustee of the Sarah C.
Getty Trust, the J. Paul Getty Museum and Texaco. Those causes of action included
claims based on breach of contract and tortious interference with contract. Pennzoil Co.
v. Getty Oil Co., No. 7425, slip op. (Del. Ch. Apr. 12, 1984). Pennzoil subsequently
dropped its tortious interference claim against Texaco in Delaware and refiled it in Texas.
For a general discussion of the Texaco-Pennzoil case, see Baron & Baron, The Pennzoil-
Texaco Dispute: An Independent Analysis, 38 Baylor L. Rev. 253 (1986); Comment, Tex-
aco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Some Thoughts on the Limits of Federal Court Power over State
Court Proceedings, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 767 (1986).
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C. Two Approaches to Impose a Duty to Negotiate in Good Faith on
Parties
This Article discusses two ways to create and enforce a duty to negoti-
ate in good faith. The first, using promissory estoppel, is a less satisfac-
tory method of creating the duty to negotiate than is the second, which
would enforce the obligation to negotiate as a mutually binding
contract.76
1. The Impact of Promissory Estoppel
In the "agreement in principle" context, plaintiffs contending that a
court should enforce such an agreement will typically assert that the
court should invoke promissory estoppel. 7 The plaintiffs will argue that
76. As noted supra at note 6, courts are in disagreement over the extent to which
directors can bind the target corporation to an exclusive merger agreement. If a court
holds that the directors could not bind the corporation in the face of a higher offer, then,
if the "agreement in principle" were intrepreted as a contract to consummate, the corpo-
ration could likely withdraw from the contract with impunity. The question that follows
is whether, if the "agreement in principle" is viewed as a contract to negotiate rather than
as a contract to consummate, a court should enforce that obligation against the corpora-
tion, even if it would not have enforced the contract as a contract to consummate the
transaction. Entering into a contract to negotiate should be within the realm of the direc-
tors' responsibility in managing the corporation, and the directors' actions should be
judged based on whether they have complied with their fiduciary duties. See supra note
7. Other commentators take a more restrictive view of the actions that directors can take
in limiting the shareholders' role in the merger and acquisition process. See. e.g., Bux-
baum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 1671,
1706 (1985), where Professor Buxbaum contends that "lock up," "crown jewel," and
"hostage" provisions, as well as other types of liquidated damages provisions that make it
substantially more expensive for the target corporation to withdraw from the transaction,
are attempting "to prevent the shareholders from exercising their statutory right of rejec-
tion by making the costs so high that acceptance cannot fairly be characterized as a
choice; rather, it is a forgone result dictated by the board's 'managerial' activity of grant-
ing these options or penalties." Id. If the "agreement in principle" were viewed as in-
creasing the costs to shareholders so significantly as to deny shareholders the effective
right to decide the merger issue, Professor Buxbaum would presumably argue that it
should not be enforced. See id.
77. See, e.g., California Natural, Inc. v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 465, 472-
73 (D.N.J. 1986); Continental Fin. Servs. v. First Nat'l Boston Corp., No. CA 82-1505-T,
slip op. at 11 (D. Mass. Aug. 30, 1984); A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium For Special-
praeparater v. I.M.C. Chemical Group, Inc., No. 78 C 2872, slip op. (N.D. I1. Aug. 26,
1982), appeal dismissed, 725 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1984), on remand, No. 78-C-2872, slip
op. (N.D. Il1. July 17, 1985); Chromalloy American Corp. v. Universal Housing Sys. of
Am., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 544, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd mem., 697 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.
1982); Coley v. Lang, 339 So. 2d 70, 75 (Ala. Ct. App. 1976); Consolidated Petroleum
Indus. v. Jacobs, 648 S.W.2d 363, 367 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
For general discussions of promissory estoppel, see Farber & Matheson. supra note 36;
Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 678 (1984); Hen-
derson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 Yale L.J. 343 (1969);
Note, Once More into the Breach: Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Damage Doctrine,
37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 559 (1970) [hereinafter Once More into the Breach].
In addition to raising a promissory estoppel argument, plaintiffs often make an argu-
ment based on equitable estoppel. In contrast to promissory estoppel that relates to reli-
ance on a promise regardless of whether the breaching party has made a misrepresetation,
144 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
they have reasonably relied to their detriment on a promise made by the
defendants, either in their handshake agreement, their letter of intent or
perhaps both, and that they have been damaged as a result. Under the
approach taken by section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts,7 8 the promise is binding if injustice can be avoided only through
enforcement of the promise.
Courts generally have rejected the plaintiffs' promissory estoppel argu-
ment in this situation. They have found that the situation did not justify
taking the contract out of the statute of frauds, 79 there was no promise on
which the plaintiffs could rely, s° or that, even if a promise did exist, reli-
ance on that promise was unreasonable."
Despite the general unwillingness of courts to rely on promissory es-
toppel to provide a remedy to the non-breaching party when an "agree-
ment in principle" is at issue, 2 precedent exists for using the doctrine to
equitable estoppel generally relates to misrepresentation of a statement of fact by a
breaching party. See A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium for Specialpraeparater v. I.M.C.
Chemical Group, Inc., 725 F.2d 1140, 1142 (7th Cir. 1984); Continental Fin. Servs. v.
First Nat'l Boston Corp., No. 82-1505-T, slip op. (D. Mass. Aug. 30, 1984); Klinke v.
Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 255, 258-59, 616 P.2d 644, 646 (1980);
E. Farnsworth, supra note 5, § 6.12, at 435-41 (1982); W. Keeton, supra note 40, § 105, at
733.
78. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981). In a departure from § 90 of
the First Restatement, the Restatement (Second) provides that "the remedy granted for
breach may be limited as justice requires." Id.
79. See, e.g., Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Universal Housing Sys. of Am., Inc., 495 F.
Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd mem., 697 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1982); Consolidated Petro-
leum Indus. v. Jacobs, 648 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 139 (1981) ("A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does
induce the action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."); see also California Natu-
ral, Inc. v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 465 (D.N.J. 1986); McIntosh v. Murphy,
52 Haw. 29, 469 P.2d 177 (1970); Henderson, supra note 77, at 380-83 ("As a practical
matter, the priority of the writing requirement seems to result in more restricted applica-
tion of Section 90 than would normally be the case in other settings."); Knapp, Reliance
in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 Colum. L. Rev.
52, 53 (1981).
80. E.g., Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d 257, 265 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 828 (1984).
81. See, e.g., Continental Fin. Servs. v. First Nat'l Boston Corp., No. 82-1505-T, slip
op. at 16 (D. Mass. Aug. 30, 1984) (rejecting plaintiff's promissory estoppel argument,
noting that "[r]eliance on a statement of future intent made prior to the conclusion of
negotiations in a complex business transaction is unreasonable as a matter of law" and
that "businessmen would be inhibited in their dealings if expressions of intent and the
exchange of drafts were taken as legally binding agreements"); see also Chromalloy Am.
Corp. v. Universal Housing Sys. of Am., 495 F. Supp. 544, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("In
light of all the written disclaimers of contractual liability which were made, any reliance
on the existence of a joint venture agreement was unreasonable."), aff'd, mem., 697 F.2d
289 (2d Cir. 1982); Coley v. Lang, 339 So. 2d 70, 75 (Ala. Ct. App. 1976) (finding no
action or forebearance of a "definite and substantial character") (quoting Restatement
(First) of Contracts § 90 (1932)).
82. But see, e.g., California Natural, Inc. v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 465
(D.N.J. 1986) (refusing to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment noting that
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enforce an obligation to negotiate in good faith. Many commentators
have viewed Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. " as creating such a duty to
negotiate in good faith.8 4 Hoffman represented a significant development
in the law of promissory estoppel 5 by overcoming judicial reluctance to
apply the promissory estoppel doctrine to situations involving commer-
cial transactions.8 6
In Hoffman, the plaintiff relied on assurances from Red Owl officials
and sold his businesses in anticipation of receiving a Red Owl franchise. 7
Despite the lack of a final written franchise agreement between the par-
ties, the Hoffman court held that the plaintiff actually and substantially
relied to his detriment on a promise by the defendant, and thus met the
elements necessary to invoke promissory estoppel.88
A court in the "agreement in principle" setting could rely on the Hoff-
man case as precedent for invoking promissory estoppel to effectuate the
parties' expectation that each will negotiate with the other in good
faith.8 9 The Hoffman case may not provide strong precedent for giving a
remedy when a corporate defendant involved in sophisticated business
transactions withdraws in bad faith from an "agreement in principle."
The plaintiff in Hoffman presented a particularly sympathetic case. Be-
cause promissory estoppel is an equitable remedy and within the court's
discretion, it lends itself to just such sympathetic cases. On the other
hand, courts are not always as sympathetic to corporate defendants.
factual issues remained as to plaintiff's reliance and the reasonableness thereof). For
corporate acquisition cases where courts have refused to find that the elements of promis-
sory estoppel justified taking the contract out of the statute of frauds, see Chromalloy
Am. Corp. v. Universal Housing Sys. of Am., 495 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd
mem., 697 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1982); Consolidated Petroleum Indus. v. Jacobs, 648 S.W.2d
363 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
83. 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
84. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 77, at 358-59; Note, Contracts.: Reliance Losses.-
Promissory Estoppel as a Basis of Recovery for Breach of Agreement to Agree: Hoffman v.
Red Owl Stores, Inc., 51 Cornell L.Q. 351, 353-56 (1966). But see Fried, Contract as
Promise 24 (1981) (noting that the award of reliance damages in Hoffman did not involve
enforcement of a promise but rather resulted from the false assurances that Red Owl had
made to Hoffman).
85. Despite the decision in the Hoffman case, promises made in preliminary negotia-
tions are generally not enforceable under § 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
See Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 Yale
L.J. 1261, 1314 (1980).
86. It has been noted that courts will carefully look at the reasonableness of the reli-
ance in using promissory estoppel as a mechanism to create a duty to negotiate in good
faith. See Henderson, supra note 77, at 361.
87. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 685, 133 N.W.2d 267, 270
(1965).
88. Id.
89. One of the issues that the court considered involved whether the promise required
to sustain a cause of action for promissory estoppel must contain the essential details of a
proposed transaction so that it can be deemed to be the equivalent of an offer that, upon
acceptance, will constitute a binding contract. In answering that question in the negative,
the court noted that it would be a mistake to regard an action based on promissory estop-
pel as the equivalent of a breach of contract action. Id. at 698, 133 N.W.2d at 275.
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Moreover, promissory estoppel is not the preferable way to enforce the
obligation to negotiate in good faith." If the parties are viewed as having
undertaken a contractual obligation to negotiate at the "agreement in
principle" stage, action or forbearance in reliance on the promise should
not be required. There is also no need to determine whether the prom-
isor could reasonably have expected such action or forbearance.2
Although section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts no longer
requires that the action or forbearance be of a definite and substantial
character, it retains both the requirement of some action or forbearance
in reliance on the promise, and the promisor's reasonable expectation of
such action or forbearance. 9
2
Moreover, even though section 90 gives courts using the doctrine of
promissory estoppel the flexibility to award whatever remedy justice re-
quires, 93 a recent study indicates that the vast majority of courts now
90. See Note, A Call for a Common Law Culpa in Contrahendo Counterpart, 15
U.S.F. L. Rev. 587 (1981), which notes that if promissory estoppel is merely a substitute
for consideration, then the contract should be treated as sacredly as any contract. If, on
the other hand, promissory estoppel is being used to remedy a different type of wrong
such as a breach of a duty to negotiate in good faith, as was arguably the case in Hoffman
v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965), then the need arises to create
a more flexible remedy. The author concludes that because of the confusion over damages
and agreements to agree, promissory estoppel is not the best mechanism to use to create a
duty to negotiate in good faith. Rather, the author would prefer adopting an "implied in
fact" contract approach. A Call for Common Law Culpa in Contrahendo Counterpart,
supra, at 604-15.
91. As discussed in Part II, C of this Article, there will, as a practical matter, always
be forbearance when a contract to negotiate is found if that contract is premised on the
notion that each party, by entering into the "agreement in principle," has forgone certain
opportunities. An additional problem with promissory estoppel is that if reliance is re-
quired, it becomes difficult to determine on which promise the party relied. For example,
is the promise one relating to consummation of the transaction or is it merely one to
negotiate in good faith? In the corporate acquisition area, courts have refused to rely on
promissory estoppel. They seem to require that a plaintiff cannot use promissory estoppel
without proof of reliance on a promise to consummate the transaction, implying that
reliance on a promise to negotiate is insufficient. See, e.g., Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM
Corp., 727 F.2d 257, 265 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984); Chromalloy Amer.
Corp. v. Universal Housing Sys. of Am., 495 F. Supp. 544, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd
mem., 697 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1982).
92. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 and Reporter's Notes (1981). The
Hoffman case is now included as an example in section 90 illustrating how the Restate-
ment provision can be applied. Nevertheless, courts in the corporate acquisition area have
generally continued to require that the detriment to the promisee be of a definite and
substantial nature. See, e.g., California Natural, Inc. v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 631 F.
Supp. 465, 472 (D.N.J. 1986).
93. Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts explicitly provides that the
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires. Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 90 (1981). That flexibility could lead courts to vary the remedy for breach of
the good faith duty. Assuming the parties relied, a court could limit the non-breaching
party to his out-of-pocket costs incurred in entering into the "agreement in principle."
This would not adequately compensate that party for the opportunities that he has lost
while being out of the market. A court could also award the non-breaching party his
expectation interest, which could include lost profits. This remedy overcompensates the
non-breaching party because, in effect, it compensates that party as if a contract to con-
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award full expectation damages in promissory estoppel cases. 4 A court
following the majority approach and awarding expectation damages in
"agreement in principle" cases may not be enforcing a duty to negotiate
in good faith but, rather, may be enforcing a final contract under the "all
or nothing" approach. If a court views the promise on which the non-
breaching party is relying as a contract to consummate the transaction,
and if it awards expectation damages as a remedy for breach of that
promise, then the promissory estoppel doctrine does not overcome the
flaws in the "all or nothing" approach. Unfortunately, courts have not
used the flexibility of section 90 to tailor a remedy that enforces the par-
ties' commercial expectations. This inflexible approach has resulted in
too much uncertainty for the parties. Although the parties may not have
agreed on a contract even if they had negotiated in good faith, if a court
invokes promissory estoppel, the withdrawing party might be liable for
full expectation damages.95
2. Reprosystem, B. V v. SCM Corp. and the Growing Judicial
Recognition of a Duty to Negotiate in Good Faith
Rather than invoking promissory estoppel to enforce an "agreement in
summate the transaction had been entered into. By recognizing a separate contract to
negotiate, courts will be able to recognize a breach and tailor the remedy to compensate
for that breach. See infra text accompanying notes 179-91. Some commentators argue
that expectation damages should be awarded when a promise is enforced on the basis of
promissory estoppel. See, e.g., Once More into the Breach, supra note 77, at 563-64 (dis-
cussing the difficulties involved in determining an appropriate remedy). The comments
to Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) provide that a promise binding under that
section is a contract and that full enforcement by normal remedies is often appropriate.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 comment d (1981).
In discussing the concept of a duty to negotiate in good faith, Professor Summers notes
that, because no contract has been formed at the negotiation stage, no recovery in con-
tract lies. In order to compensate a party harmed by one who has negotiated in bad faith,
he proposes a tort action. The problem with such a tort action is that it too does not
tailor the remedy to the breach. See Summers I, supra note 36, at 257-58. As will be
discussed, infra at text accompanying notes 165-91, by creating a contractual duty to
negotiate, damages will be awarded based on the loss resulting from the breach. The non-
breaching party will be made whole through such an award while the breaching party
will be able to reasonably determine what damages it will be required to pay. That
breaching party will have the necessary information to decide whether it is in its eco-
nomic best interest to breach or continue to negotiate. See R. Posner, Economic Analysis
of the Law 88-89 (2d ed. 1977); Once More into the Breach, supra note 77, at 578-79;
Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle:
Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 Colum. L.
Rev. 554, 558 (1977).
94. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 36, at 909.
95. The recent jury verdict in Texaco-Pennzoil may present the most dramatic exam-
ple of what a breaching party has to fear by accepting a higher offer. The jury verdict in
that case calculated damages based on Pennzoil's expectancy interest with the result that
Texaco, an entity well within the top 50 corporations in America in all relevant categories
based on the most recent Forbes 500, was placed on the brink of financial disaster. The
Forbes 500s: The Nation's Largest Companies Ranked Four Ways, 137 Forbes 116, 232
(Apr. 28, 1986). The impact that the jury verdict had on Texaco is discussed in Texaco,
Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 3270 (1986).
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principle," courts should view the parties as having entered into a mutu-
ally binding agreement, with each party having undertaken an obligation
to negotiate with the other in good faith to arrive at a definitive con-
tract.96 That obligation should itself be enforceable regardless of whether
either party takes any action in reliance thereon.97 The advantage of
viewing the "agreement in principle" as a mutually binding contract to
negotiate, rather than relying on promissory estoppel, is that it will result
in more certain damage awards for a breach of the "agreement in prinic-
ple." The non-breaching party should be compensated for the harm it
has suffered in reliance on the other party's duty to negotiate in good
faith. 98
Assuming that promissory estoppel is a less satisfactory means of com-
pensating a party for its counterpart's failure to negotiate in good faith
than basing recovery on a mutually binding contract to negotiate, the
question then becomes whether we can formulate such a contractual
duty that is capable of enforcement. The answer is yes, even though
some recent case law indicates that courts willing to acknowledge a duty
to bargain in good faith are often unwilling to recognize such a duty as a
separate contractual obligation.99
Courts that recognize a duty to negotiate in good faith could hold in
three different ways. First, a court may hold that a withdrawing party is
liable for breach of a duty to negotiate in good faith regardless of whether
an enforceable contract to consummate the transaction is found. "m Sec-
96. The notion that there is a separate duty to negotiate in good faith arises originally
out of the German law doctrine of culpa in contrahendo, or fault in negotiating. See
Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Con-
tract: A Comparative Study, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 401 (1964).
97. As noted above, when determining whether the parties have undertaken a duty to
negotiate in good faith, it is important to determine that each party, by entering into the
"agreement in principle," has forgone certain opportunities. This agreement to forgo
alternative opportunities could constitute the forebearance necessary to trigger recovery
under § 90. In the Hoffman situation, for example, Hoffman would be deemed to have
forgone the opportunity of negotiating with other grocery franchisors while negotiating
with Red Owl. See infra text accompanying notes 131-33.
98. See infra text accompanying notes 179-91.
99. The letter of intent may expressly obligate the parties to negotiate in good faith or
to use their "best efforts" to reach an agreement. Pinnacle Books, Inc. v. Harlequin
Enters., 519 F. Supp. 118, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Thompson v. Liquichimica of America,
Inc., 481 F. Supp. 361, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Farnsworth distinguishes the duty to act in
good faith and a "best efforts" clause:
Good faith is a standard that has honesty and fairness at its core
and that is imposed on every party to a contract. Best efforts is a standard that
has diligence as its essence and is imposed only on those contracting parties that
have undertaken such performance. The two standards are distinct and that of
best efforts is the more exacting.
Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One's Promises: The Duty of Best Efforts in Contract
Law, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1984) (footnote omitted).
100. See, e.g., Thompson v. Liquichimica of America, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 365, 366(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (court held best efforts clause could give rise to binding obligation be-
cause "[u]nlike an 'agreement to agree', which does not constitute a 'closed' proposition.
and consequently is not an agreement at all, an agreement to use best efforts is a closed
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ond, a court may recognize that a separate contractual duty to negotiate
exists, but may find that such a duty is too indefinite to enforce.,'
Third, a court may acknowledge the duty to negotiate in good faith but
may, even without relying on the agreement's indefiniteness, revert to the
"all or nothing" approach to decide whether an enforceable contract has
yet arisen."
Perhaps the most complete judicial discussion of a contractual duty to
negotiate in good faith in the corporate acquisition setting appears in the
district court opinion in Reprosystem, B. V v. SCM Corp.'t 3 In April
1976 SCM and Reprosystem began negotiating for the sale of SCM's six
office copier subsidiaries in Europe. In May, Reprosystem offered
$9,000,000 for the businesses."° No further negotiations occurred until
August. While not accepting the earlier letter offer, SCM provided
Reprosystem with a list of items that it considered essential to an agree-
ment. The parties supplemented that list, which became the basis for
further negotiations.105
proposition, discrete and actionable"); Chase v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 744 F.2d 566,
571 (7th Cir. 1984) (court held commitment by parties to negotiate in good faith binding
if parties intended enforceable contract, even though agreement was "merely a letter of
intent"); see also Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Indus., 248 A.2d 625, 629 (Del. 1968)
(holding that letter of intent obligated each party to attempt in good faith to reach a final
and formal agreement and indicated that a court could conclude that one of the parties
had breached that duty). But see Continental Fin. Servs. v. The First Nat'l Boston Corp.,
No. 82-1505-T, slip op. at 12 (D. Mass. Aug 30, 1984) (holding that absent "compelling
judicial precedent," court unwilling to create duty to negotiate in good faith).
101. See, eg., Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d 257, 264 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984) (acknowledging that duty to negotiate in good faith might
exist but finding it too indefinite to enforce); Mocca Lounge, Inc. v. Misak, 94 A.D.2d
761, 763, 462 N.Y.S.2d 704, 707 (1981) (although court recognized that duty of good
faith negotiating did exist, it found that no such duty could be implied because "[n]o
objective criteria or standards against which defendants' efforts [could] be measured were
stated in the contract of sale"); see also Jillcy Film Enter. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 593
F. Supp. 515, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (refusing to enforce provision requiring parties to
negotiate in good faith, on grounds of uncertainty and vagueness "[b]ecause no definite,
objective criteria or standards" were offered against which to judge the defendant's per-
formance); Candid Prod. v. International Skating Union, 530 F. Supp. 1330, 1337
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that "[a]n agreement to negotiate in good faith is even more
vague than an agreement to agree"); Pinnacle Books, Inc. v. Harlequin Enter., 519 F.
Supp. 118, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (in disapproving the holding in Thompson 1' Li-
quichimica, court held that "'[b]est efforts' or similar clauses, like any other contractual
agreement, must set forth in definite and certain terms every material element of the
contemplated bargain.... Essential to the enforcement of a 'best efforts' clause is a clear
set of guidelines against which the parties' 'best efforts' may be measured.").
102. See, e.g., Pepsico, Inc. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 307 F. Supp. 713, 720 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on basis that no contract ex-
isted even though court specifically recognized that there could have arisen duty to nego-
tiate in good faith if a contract had come into existence).
103. 522 F. Supp. 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), revd., 727 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 828 (1984).
104. Reprosystem's offer was conditioned on both its satisfaction with the audit its
accountants were to perform of the subsidiary businesses and also on the entering into of
a mutually satisfactory formal agreement. Id. at 1261.
105. In fact, the district court found that, by mid-September, the parties had agreed
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As negotiations continued, the parties began drafting the formal docu-
ments necessary to consummate the transaction. Although the negotiat-
ing and drafting process continued on into December with execution of a
final agreement seemingly in the offing, 10 6 prospects for finalizing the
transaction worsened when, effective January 1, 1977, the person who
had directed negotiations for SCM was replaced. The newly appointed
officer reviewed the transaction and determined that the businesses being
sold were more profitable than earlier projected. After SCM formally
broke off negotiations on February 2, 1977, Reprosystem sued for dam-
ages, alleging among other things, breach of contract, promissory estop-
pel, and failure to perform and to negotiate in good faith. 107
The issue confronting the court was whether a contract existed despite
the lack of executed formal documents, where the drafts prepared explic-
itly provided that they were to become binding only upon execution.0 "
The district court, relying on the objective theory of contract, found that
the parties had reached an agreement'0 9 in December 1976 and that
SCM's subsequent actions were inconsistent with its duty to perform that
agreement in good faith."o
Because the objective facts indicated that the parties had reached an
agreement, the court rejected SCM's argument that a formal signing of
final documents was necessary. The court based much of its reasoning
on the parties' agreement on the essential terms of the transaction. The
court relied on section 2-204(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code to
hold that, as long as the parties had agreed on the essential terms of the
both on a formula for determining the price to be paid for the subsidiaries and on an
arrangement under which SCM would operate the businesses subsequent to August 31,
1976 on Reprosystem's behalf. Id.
106. The court found that:
It is undisputed that the drafts were reviewed, page by page, and all open issues
were sought to be resolved. Parties caucused in various groups, discussions
were held, and agreement was reached wherever possible. It was contemplated
that another draft would be generated by Sullivan & Cromwell, and indeed on
the evening of December 15 another draft of the Global Agreement was
produced.
Id. at 1266.
The meeting continued on December 16, and at its conclusion, the assembled group
was asked by Rodich whether there were any open terms, and none were advanced. Sulli-
van & Cromwell was to provide agreements embodying the discussions. Id. at 1266. By
this time, sixteen drafts of the agreements had already been passed between the parties.
Id. at 1265.
107. Id. at 1259.
108. Id. at 1274-77.
109. The Reprosystem court considered a number of factors to decide whether the par-
ties had intended a contract to arise even prior to formal execution of documents. For
example, SCM's 10-K report for the fiscal year ending June 30, and filed with the SEC on
September 30, 1976, stated that SCM had reached an "agreement in principle" to sell its
European copier subsidiaries. Additionally, a press release issued on September 28 re-
ferred to an "agreement in principle" having been reached. Finally, on November 8,
SCM's board of directors adopted a resolution authorizing its officers to negotiate the sale
of the businesses. Id. at 1262-69, 1273.
110. Id. at 1273.
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transaction, the court could supply the missing ones."'
In addition to its discussion of whether an agreement to consummate
the transaction existed, the district court dealt at length with whether a
duty to negotiate in good faith had arisen and whether SCM had
breached that duty. The court, in concluding that such a duty did exist
and that SCM had breached it, attempted to go beyond the "all or noth-
ing" approach and, after noting the difficulty in fashioning an appropri-
ate remedy, 1 2 adopted a remedy theory based on restitution or unjust
enrichment." 3 On that basis, the court awarded Reprosystem the profits
earned by the copier businesses during the period in which it deemed
SCM had, pursuant to the parties' understanding, operated those busi-
nesses on Reprosystem's behalf." 4
The Reprosystem court focused on the proper issue by recognizing that
the parties, through their lengthy negotiating process, had obligated
themselves to deal with one another in good faith." 5 Unfortunately,
however, even though the court acknowledged a duty to negotiate in
good faith, it did not properly view the contractual good faith duty as
separate from the contract to consummate the transaction. Rather,
under the Reprosystem approach, a court will only find a breach of duty
to negotiate if it first finds an enforceable contract to consummate the
transaction. The Reprosystem court found that once the parties had
agreed on all material terms of a contract, a final and binding contract
existed. The breach of the good faith duty was thus a breach of the per-
111. Id at 1275-76. The district court also considered a statute of frauds argument but
held that the final draft of the agreement together with other correspondence and releases
sufficed to satisfy the statute. Id. at 1277-78.
112. Id. at 1280. The difficulty in fashioning such a remedy was borne out at subse-
quent proceedings in the case where the district court's award had to be implemented by
determining the true profits of the copier businesses. See Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM
Corp., 565 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 727 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 828 (1984).
113. 522 F. Supp. at 1281. The court specifically rejected Reprosystem's promissory
estoppel argument and claim for reliance damages. The court noted that reliance dam-
ages might have included the value of opportunities that Reprosystem had forgone in
anticipation of the closing of the transaction. Id. at 1281 n. 11.
114. Id. at 1280. The court clearly indicated that Reprosystem was not entitled to
expectation damages as a result of the breach. Id. at 1281. The reason why expectation
damages would not be awarded, however, is not completely clear from the opinion. It
appears as if the court was unwilling to award expectation damages because of Reprosys-
tem's inability to prove its financial ability to ultimately consummate the transaction.
Had Reprosystem been able to prove such ability, it is unclear whether the court would
have awarded expectation damages as a remedy.
115. Whether the district court correctly determined the liability issue presents a diffi-
cult question. If the parties had clearly indicated an intent not to be bound to any type of
contract, including a contract to negotiate in good faith, a court should respect that in-
tent. Merely specifying in an unsigned document, however, that the document should
not constitute a binding contract until it is signed should not necessarily be construed as
indicating that the parties are disclaiming a duty to negotiate in good faith. See also infra
text accompanying note 135.
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formance of the contract rather than the breach of a separate obligation
to negotiate.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed," 6 finding that the language of
the contract drafts, taken together with the other communications be-
tween the parties, indicated that the parties did not intend to be bound
until the final execution of definitive agreements. 7 The court reasoned
that such an intent comported with commercial reality in such a large
transaction. In considering the issue of whether SCM had breached a
duty to negotiate in good faith, the court relied on the typical "all or
nothing" approach. Since the court concluded that no contract existed,
it found that SCM could not have breached any good faith duty. In
addition, the court held that any implied agreement to negotiate in good
faith that might have existed was too indefinite for a court to enforce
under New York law." 18
The Second Circuit's conclusions indicate its unwillingness to find a
duty to negotiate in good faith unless the court first finds that the parties
had an enforceable agreement to consummate the transaction. These
conclusions, however, produce the potentially inequitable result we noted
earlier." 9 In Reprosystem, the testimony indicated that, after the attor-
neys had generated sixteen drafts of the agreement, the parties had re-
solved all open issues. Nevertheless, the parties had not yet executed a
definitive agreement. The parties had indicated in these drafts that they
were to be final and binding only when executed and delivered. 20 Thus,
the court may have accurately interpreted the parties' intent that an en-
forceable definitive agreement would arise only after the parties had exe-
cuted it. That intent should not mean, however, that until the final
agreement is executed either party may act as it likes with impunity.
Rather, once the parties have entered into an "agreement in principle,"
each party reasonably expects to be obligated to act in good faith to agree
116. Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
828 (1984).
117. Id. at 261-62.
118. Id. at 264. Following the Second Circuit decision in Reprosystem, New York law
has tended toward not finding a binding contract in the absence of a final written agree-
ment. See. e.g., Winston v. Mediafare Entertainment Corp., 777 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1985)
(finding no intent to enter into binding settlement agreement in absence of executed writ-
ing); R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding no
binding franchise contract in absence of signed written agreement); United Acquisition
Corp. v. Banque Paribas, 631 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding no binding contract
to purchase corporation's stock in absence of written contract); Spinnerin Yarn Co. v.
Apparel Retail Corp., 614 F. Supp. 1174, 1179-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding no binding
purchase contract in absence of a writing and absence of conduct by defendant recogniz-
ing contract). But see Pennzoil Co. v. Getty Oil Co., No. 7425, slip op. at 19-26 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 15, 1984) (finding on motion for summary judgment that factual issue existed as to
parties' intent to be bound in absence of final, executed transaction agreement).
119. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
120. Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1257, 1267 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
rev'd, 727 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 469 U.S. 828 (1984).
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on the terms of a definitive agreement, regardless of whether they ulti-
mately execute a definitive agreement.
C. Applying the Good Faith Duty
The reluctance of many courts to consider whether a separate duty to
negotiate in good faith exists, and the reluctance of other courts to en-
force such a duty even if they find that it does exist, may stem from two
possible concerns. The first concern is that good faith can be a difficult
concept to apply 2 ' and, thus, courts may fear that they are unable to
determine whether one of the parties has failed to negotiate in good faith.
The second concern may arise out of the difficulty in devising an appro-
priate remedy for the breach of such a duty. 22 Both of these concerns
are evidenced by some courts focusing on the indefiniteness of an "agree-
ment in principle" as the basis for not enforcing it as a contract to
negotiate.
Concern over the application of the good faith duty most likely stems
from the difficulty of defining, or perhaps even deciding whether to de-
fine, good faith.123 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts views good
faith as an excluder.' 4 Under this approach, good faith cannot be de-
fined but, rather, merely excludes many forms of bad faith.' 25 Although
various examples of bad faith conduct can be offered, the excluder ap-
proach views as too confining any definition of good faith or any defini-
tive listing of examples of bad faith conduct.' 26 The excluder approach
121. See, e.g., Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 Duke LJ.
619, 642-49 (1981); Holmes, supra note 36, at 382 ("Due to the fact that 'good faith' is an
amorphous concept, manifested in endlessly variable settings and forms, it does not iden-
tify a manageable body of law for analytic inquiry.").
122. See Knapp, supra note 10, at 693.
123. Holmes, supra note 36, at 400-01; Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-lts
Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 810, 829-30 (1982) [hereinafter
Summers II]. One commentator explained why "good faith" should remain undefined,
stating that:
The breadth of meanings attributable to good faith in various contexts sup-
ports the hypothesis that the concept has no general meaning of its own and
lends credence to the excluder approach to good faith .. . . If good faith is
defined, it leads to confusion; if good faith is left undefined, it confers on the
courts broad powers that can easily be abused.
Perhaps the concept of good faith takes on so many different meanings in
different contexts because at base it is nothing more than a requirement of fair-
ness-a definition so broad as to be virtually meaningless.
Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications under the UCC: Good Faith and the Doctrine of
Economic Duress, 64 Iowa L. Rev. 849, 877 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
124. Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 205 (1981). The "'excluder" analysis was
first articulated by philosophers such as Aristotle and J.L. Austin. See Summers I. supra
note 36, at 201-02.
125. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 205 comment d (1981) (citing as
examples of bad faith: evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking
off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, and
interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party's performance): Summers 1.
supra note 36, at 196.
126. See Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor
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views good faith as an evolving concept that can be used to fit any situa-
tion on a case-by-case basis.127
Although the Restatement's provision does not directly address the
issue of good faith in the formation of a contract, the comment to the
section indicates that bad faith in negotiation, although not within the
purview of the section itself, may give rise to sanctions. 28 Professor
Summers, one of the more ardent advocates of the excluder approach,
specifically notes in his seminal article on good faith' 29 that bad faith in
negotiating can result in a cause of action, and that among the forms of
bad faith in negotiating is the abuse of the power to break off
negotiations. '30
More recently, a different approach to good faith has been proposed.
Under this analysis, good faith is examined by use of a forgone opportu-
nities test."' When a contract is formed, each party has agreed to forgo
certain alternative opportunities, and thus has limited its discretion. A
party will act in bad faith by trying to recapture alternative opportunities
it had forgone at the time of contracting. As an illustration, if A had
agreed to sell 100 designated widgets to B for $1.00 each, A has limited
its discretion by forgoing the opportunity of selling those same widgets to
C for $1.50 each. If A now tries to sell those widgets to C, A will be
acting in bad faith by trying to recapture an alternative opportunity it
had forgone at the time of contracting with B.
Professor Burton, who first formulated the "forgone opportunities ap-
proach," poses two questions. 32 First, at the time of contract formation,
what were the reasonably expected costs of performance (forgone oppor-
tunities) to the party who has allegedly breached the contract? Second,
at the time of performance, did the party who allegedly breached the
contract use its discretion to recapture an opportunity that it had forgone
on entering the contract?
Professor Burton's forgone opportunities approach can be particularly
helpful in determining whether the parties have entered into a contract to
negotiate and whether either party has breached that contract. In decid-
ing whether the parties have a contract to negotiate in good faith, a court
can look at whether the parties have forgone alternative opportunities.
Professor Burton states that courts should focus attention on the time of
contract formation. This analysis involves an objective inquiry into the
promisee's reasonable expectations as to which opportunities the discre-
tion-exercising promisor acting in bad faith had forgone by entering into
Summers, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 497, 498 (1984) [hereinafter Burton II]; Summers II, supra
note 123, at 820-21.
127. See Summers I, supra note 36, at 206-07; Summers II, supra note 123, at 822.
128. Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 205 comment c (1981).
129. Summers I, supra note 36.
130. Id. at 220-22.
131. Burton I, supra note 36.
132. Burton II, supra note 126, at 506-07.
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the contract. 33 Under traditional contract law principles, these forgone
opportunities would constitute consideration.
In the "agreement in principle" setting, this analysis can be illustrated
by the following hypothetical. Assume that on January 1, Acquiring
Corporation and Target Corporation began negotiating for purchase by
Acquiring of Target. Acquiring formed a subsidiary corporation that
was to tender for some or all of Target's shares at a specified price. After
completion of the tender offer, Target was to be merged into the subsidi-
ary. Target is a processor of Florida orange juice and about 75% of its
assets consist of orange groves in Florida. On January 10, although no
definitive agreement had been reached, the parties entered into either a
handshake understanding that Acquiring would tender for all of Target's
shares at a price of $25 per share or a letter of intent spelling out the
basic terms of the transaction. In both situations, the parties understood
that the transaction was subject to their negotiating and entering into a
definitive agreement.
Once the "agreement in principle" was reached, the attorneys began
negotiating the terms of a definitive merger agreement, and although dis-
agreements existed over the wording of the final agreement, the negotia-
tions were ongoing and had centered around the provisions necessary to
implement the transaction. However, negotiations came to an abrupt
halt when, on January 13, Vulture Corporation approached Target's
management with a proposal in which Vulture agreed to buy all Target's
stock that might be tendered at a price of $30 per share. Target ulti-
mately accepted Vulture's offer.
In the hypothetical, although their letter of intent might not be en-
forceable as a contract to consummate the transaction, it may constitute
an enforceable contract to negotiate in good faith. If each party could
reasonably expect that the other, by entering into the letter of intent, has
forgone certain opportunities, then sufficient consideration has passed be-
tween the parties for a contract to have come into existence., 4 By ac-
cepting Vulture's offer, Acquiring might reasonably conclude that Target
is attempting to recapture a forgone opportunity and is breaching its con-
tract to negotiate in good faith.' 3 5
In addition to clearing the consideration hurdle, Professor Burton's
first inquiry can help a court evaluate whether the "agreement in princi-
ple" is sufficiently definite. If a court can look at the terms of the "agree-
ment in principle" and find a sufficiently definite understanding between
the parties as to the opportunities that each had forgone, then it can find
133. Id.
134. See Burton I, supra note 36, at 387-88 ("The definitenes and mutualit) require-
ments indicate that contract formation depends on a real commitment by each party. In
other words, each party must forgo some future opportunity upon formation and thus
restrain its future freedom in some way.") (footnote omitted).
135. See, e.g., Burton I, supra note 36, at 389; Note. Board of Directors Approral
Clauses in Corporate Contracts: The Duty of Good Faith. 9 J. Corp. L. 931. 939-40 (1984).
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that the parties formed a contract to negotiate. The definiteness required
for the formation of this contract should be viewed on a different level
than the definiteness that would be required to form a contract to con-
summate. A court should only be concerned here with determining
whether the parties had forgone opportunities. It should not be seeking
to supply sufficient terms to create an enforceable contract to close the
transaction.
Even if consideration is found, and a court determines that the agree-
ment contains sufficient definiteness to permit the finding of an enforcea-
ble contract to negotiate, it must still find that the parties intended to be
bound by the contract to negotiate. By focusing on the opportunities
that the parties had forgone, a court can discern what the parties ex-
pected from their agreement. For example, if the agreement contains
either an implicit or an explicit understanding that the parties will with-
draw from the market during the negotiation process, a presumption
should arise that the parties intended to be bound to negotiate in good
faith. On the other hand, if the parties indicated in the "agreement in
principle" that they did not intend any obligation to have arisen, includ-
ing one to negotiate in good faith, then a court should respect that intent.
Absent an explicit statement in the "agreement in principle" disclaiming
any obligation to negotiate in good faith, focusing on the forgone oppor-
tunities will help a court determine what the parties expected from the
"agreement in principle."
Professor Burton's inquiry is whether the withdrawing party has
breached the contract to negotiate in good faith and on whether that
party has used its discretion to recapture an opportunity that it had for-
gone on entering into the contract. Here, the court should examine the
promisor's subjective intent 136 in withdrawing from the negotiations.' 37
This inquiry should help a court determine whether the promisor is with-
drawing from the transaction because it is honestly dissatisfied with the
progress of the negotiations or because it changed its mind irrespective of
the status of negotiations. 13  If the promisor is honestly dissatisfied with
the progress of the negotiations, it can withdraw from the contract with
impunity. If, on the other hand, the promisor merely declines to pursue
the transaction, it may be attempting to recapture a forgone opportunity
136. Distinguishing between the objective and subjective approaches does not present
an easy task. Professor Farnsworth has noted that the differences between an objective
standard and a subjective standard may not be that great since "[u]nder a subjective test
of good faith it is always open to the trier of the facts to evaluate the credibility of a claim
of 'honesty in fact,' and in doing so to take account of the reasonableness or unreasona-
bleness of the claim." Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasona.
bleness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 666, 672 (1963); see also
Brook, Conditions of Personal Satisfaction in the Law of Contracts, 27 N.Y.L. Sch. L.
Rev. 103, 115-16 (question of person's honesty in reporting his state of mind can be
determined as can any other question of fact).
137. Burton I, supra note 36, at 389.
138. Id. at 390-97, 401.
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in breach of the contract to negotiate. 13
A look at some case law is helpful to illustrate how the forgone oppor-
tunities approach might work in the corporate acquisition setting. In
Interway, Inc. v. Alagna,'4 the parties entered into a letter of intent pro-
viding that Interway would transfer approximately $1.6 million of its
stock to Alagna in exchange for Alagna's interest in Trailer Leasing Cor-
poration.14 The letter of intent, prepared by Interway and accepted by
Alagna, stated that " '[o]ur purchase is subject to a definitive Purchase
and Sale Contract to be executed by the parties.' "42 The day following
the execution of the letter of intent, Alagna informed Interway that he
would not proceed with execution of the final contract. Interway
sued. 143
The court, after indicating that the parties' intent controlled the ques-
tion of whether they had entered into an enforceable contract, held that
the letter unambiguously indicated the tentative nature of any agreement
between them. Adhering to the "all or nothing" approach, the appellate
court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint."as
Applying the forgone opportunities approach to the facts in Interway
demonstrates how a court could find an enforceable duty to negotiate in
good faith. First, a court would determine whether each party had for-
gone opportunities by entering into the letter of intent.'45 If so, the court
would then have to focus on the second inquiry-determining precisely
which opportunities these were and deciding whether Alagna was now
trying to recapture them.
In the first step, the court's concern should be whether a mutually
binding contract has been formed. The court should focus on forgone
opportunities to determine whether the parties gave consideration and
intended to be bound, and whether the "agreement in principle" is suffi-
ciently definite to be enforced as a contract to negotiate. In the Interway
case, because the important price term was specified,' 46 a court could
139. Most of the cases in the corporate acquisition area concerning the enforceability
of "agreements in principle" have involved situations where the seller has withdrawn.
See supra note 37.
140. 85 Ill. App. 3d 1094, 407 N.E.2d 615 (1980).
141. See id. at 1096, 407 N.E.2d at 617.
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. The determination here concerning the forgone opportunities still should be fo-
cused on the parties' intent. The issue remains whether the parties intended to bind
themselves to any obligation. The forgone opportunities approach should help a court
determine that intent. If the parties clearly indicate, for example, that they do not intend
any legal obligation to arise, including any duty to negotiate in good faith, until definitive
documents are executed, courts should respect that intent.
146. As to the importance of the price term in a corporate acquisition, see generally
Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 757 (3d Cir. 1984) ("Agreement as to price
and structure provides concrete evidence of a mature understanding between the negoti-
ating corporations."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); Citizens Util. Co. v. Wheeler.
156 Cal. App. 2d 423, 428, 319 P.2d 763, 769 (1958).
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reasonably conclude that, by entering into the letter of intent, each party
had limited its discretion and had forgone certain opportunities. A buyer
who has entered into a letter of intent of the type present in the Interway
case, for example, reasonably might expect that the seller could not with-
draw solely because of receipt of a higher offer for the asset. '47 Similarly,
a seller reasonably could expect that the buyer cannot shop around for a
comparable substitute asset that might be available at a cheaper price. In
addition, the buyer probably is reasonable in assuming that the seller has
forgone the opportunity of taking the property off the market, as oc-
curred in Interway, without trying to negotiate an acceptable agreement
with the buyer. 148
The second step of the inquiry, determining whether the withdrawing
party has breached the good faith duty, admittedly will be difficult in
many cases. Here, the court must ask whether the promisor is withdraw-
ing because it is trying to recapture a forgone opportunity or because it
feels that negotiations have irretrievably broken down despite good faith
efforts. In the Interway case, for example, because one party withdrew
without even attempting to negotiate a final agreement, a court could
logically conclude that the party had breached his contractual duty to
negotiate in good faith.
Although the Interway case presents a clear-cut situation where one
party refused to negotiate at all, the hypothetical situation illustrates how
the analysis can become difficult in the second step. Let us assume that
after Target and Acquiring had entered into their "agreement in princi-
ple" and while negotiations were underway, a freeze hit Florida that
killed the majority of oranges in the state but miraculously left Target's
groves untouched. Would Target be liable if it decided that it no longer
wanted to continue negotiations with Acquiring, even if it did not accept
a better offer?
If Target's withdrawal from negotiations is based on its decision that
its assets are now worth more than before and that it wants to remain
independent, then Target appears to be recapturing a forgone opportu-
nity and has breached its duty to negotiate in good faith. 149 Frequently,
however, the decision to withdraw from negotiations results from a com-
bination of factors. For example, although Target may remain commit-
ted to negotiating a final agreement with Acquiring even though the
value of its assets has risen, the attitude of its negotiators toward the
negotiations is likely to change, at least subconsciously. Because Target
probably feels that the value of its bargain has diminished, it will likely
147. See Knapp, supra note 10, at 721.
148. See Summers I, supra note 36 at 220-22; Chase v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 744
F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 1984); Knapp, supra note 10, at 721.
149. If Acquiring now decides that it no longer wants to enter the business that Target
is now in and thus withdraws from negotiations on that basis, then it too appears to be
recapturing a forgone opportunity and will have breached its duty to negotiate in good
faith.
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be more inflexible in its demands and less willing to concede certain
points.
The second inquiry is undoubtedly a difficult one for courts to make,
especially because Professor Burton's approach requires a determination
of the promisor's subjective intent. 50 This difficulty should not deter the
use of this analysis, however, because courts are frequently forced to
make such determinations.' 5 '
An interesting example of a court's inquiry into a party's good faith in
negotiating, although not arising in the corporate acquisition setting, oc-
curred in Evans, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co. 52 Evans involved the negotiation
of a sublease." 3 The Evans court extensively reviewed the history of the
parties' negotiations and concluded that the defendant breached its duty
to negotiate in good faith by ignoring custom and usage, by insisting on
arbitrary clauses and by ignoring the sublessor's legitimate interests.',t
Although the Evans court may have looked at objective factors in
making its determination because the letter of intent between Evans and
Tiffany provided that the parties were to enter into a formal contract
incorporating the terms of the letter of intent within "reasonable limita-
tions, ' a similar analysis could be undertaken in the corporate acquisi-
tion setting. Thus, to evaluate the promisor's subjective intent, a court
should be able to consider usage of trade' 56 and underlying industry
150. See Holmes, supra note 36, at 403-04.
151. See, e.g., Nuvest, S.A. v. Gulf & W. Indus., 649 F.2d 943, 945 (2d Cir. 1981)
(affirming lower court's award of broker's fee because of seller's bad faith in withdrawing
from negotiations based on inability to reach agreement on breadth of warranties in
purchase and sale agreement).
152. 416 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Il. 1976).
153. Another case involving a corporate acquisition that can perhaps be explained on
the basis of the forgone opportunities approach is Mid-Continent Tel. Corp. v. Home Tel.
Co., 319 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Miss. 1970), discussed supra at text accompanying notes
54-59. There, the defendants contended that they withdrew because, among other things,
the plaintiff delayed in getting them a reorganization plan and in agreeing on an employ-
ment contract for the principal shareholder's son. The court found that the true reason
for the defendants' repudiation of the contract was the receipt of a higher cash offer
received from a third party. On that basis, the court held defendant's action in withdraw-
ing was wrongful repudiation and breach of its contractual obligations. Id. at 1196.
The court held that, by entering into the preliminary letter of intent, Home Telephone
had forgone the opportunity of "shopping around" for a higher offer unless it was unable,
after negotiating in good faith, to agree on a final agreement with defendant. By ac-
cepting a higher offer, Home Telephone attempted to recapture a forgone opportunity.
In analyzing the second step of the good faith analysis (determining whether the defend-
ant was honestly dissatisfied with the negotiations or was using its dissatisfaction as an
excuse), the court in effect found that Home Telephone was masking its true reason for
withdrawing-receipt of a higher offer.
154. Evans, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 416 F. Supp. at 240.
155. Id. at 239.
156. In the Evans case, the court noted that although the U.C.C. was not directly on
point since an interest in real property was at issue, it could still look to the U.C.C.'s
concept of custom and usage of trade. 416 F. Supp. at 239-40. The same logic applies to
the corporate acquisition setting. Even in looking at a party's subjective intent, custom
and usage of trade will be helpful to determine why the defendant was behaving in a
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practice157 to help determine whether the promisor was negotiating in
good faith or just taking a particularly harsh negotiating position in or-
der to create an excuse for withdrawing from the transaction. In the
latter situation, the promisor is negotiating in bad faith and should be
liable for breaching the contract since it is attempting to recapture a for-
gone opportunity.
Creating an independent cause of action for failing to negotiate in good
faith does present some dangers. The first danger is that good faith is a
difficult concept to apply, particularly because of the difficulty in defin-
ing, or even deciding whether to define, the term.' 58 What a court might
objectively view as bad faith conduct might not, in reality, have been
subjective bad faith by the party.'59 Similarly, a court might view certain
conduct as not constituting bad faith when in fact one of the parties had
in bad faith stymied negotiations in order to recapture a forgone opportu-
nity. Nevertheless, a court focusing on the good faith issue will be far
more likely to discern the parties' true intent than will a court that relies
on the "all or nothing" approach. 6 °
The second danger lies in formulating an appropriate remedy for the
breach. Some courts that have considered whether a party has breached
its duty to negotiate have found such a duty too indefinite to enforce., 6'
certain way. See also Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 222(3) (1981) ("Unless other-
wise agreed, a usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which the parties are engaged or a
usage of trade of which they know or have reason to know gives meaning to or supple-
ments or qualifies their agreement."); E. Farnsworth, supra note 5, § 7.13, at 507-15
(1982); J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 3-3, at 98-104 (2d ed.
1980). Changed circumstances may also be relevant to the court's consideration. For
example, in our hypothetical involving Target and Acquiring, a court might deem rele-
vant the freeze in Florida and the resultant increase in the value of Target's assets.
157. See Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 6 (1981) [hereinafter Burton III] ("[I]n applying
standards of interpretation and the relevant rules of performance, good faith calls atten-
tion to courses of dealing, usages of trade, and other business practices as to opportunities
forgone by the promisor, in addition to those as to benefits to be received by the
promisee.").
158. In discussing the Restatement's position that every contract imposes oil each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement, Professor
Braucher stated:
Now, the trouble with this section, of course, is that it's very general, very
abstract, and it needs specification [in] the worst way, and specification is not to
be had ....
This proposition is thoroughly acceptable if you define good faith very nar-
rowly; but as you define good faith more broadly, doubts begin to arise.
47 A.L.I. Proc. 485, 490 (1970); see also Holmes, supra note 36, at 382-83.
159. The U.C.C. provides that, although the parties cannot disclaim the duty of good
faith, they can determine in their agreement the standards by which good faith perform-
ance is to be measured so long as such standards are not manifestly unreasonable. U.C.C.
§ 1-102(3) (1978). As noted, infra at note 179, the parties should, in their "agreement in
principle," be able to disclaim any intent to bind themselves to a contract to negotiate,
and if they do so, no duty of good faith negotiation should be deemed to arise.
160. See generally, Summers II, supra note 123, at 823-24 (setting forth guidelines
judge has in examining good faith under U.C.C.).
161. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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Both the UCC'6 2 and the Restatement (Second)' 63 analyze definiteness in
terms of whether there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appro-
priate remedy. Although courts have not generally articulated the diffi-
culty in formulating an appropriate remedy as their reason for not
finding an independent cause of action for breach of the duty to negoti-
ate, this difficulty may explain the results of some cases.""
III. REMEDIES FOR BREACH
Commentators' suggestions for appropriate remedies for a breach of
the duty to negotiate in good faith have ranged from protecting either a
party's reliance interest, its expectation interest, or its restitution inter-
est. 165 Courts have not yet sufficiently explored this area and conse-
quently, there is still no judicially recognized theory of an appropriate
remedy.
Two reasons can be posited to explain this lack of development in the
area of remedies. First, courts only recently have begun to recognize the
duty to negotiate in good faith as a separate cause of action. 166 In addi-
tion, once a court suggests that the plaintiff might succeed on such a
cause of action, which often occurs in deciding a motion for summary
judgment, the parties may well settle the case out of court, thus pre-
empting any need for a court-formulated remedy.167 Second, and more
important, courts have focused their analysis on whether a binding con-
tract to consummate the transaction exists. Consequently, the court will
focus on whether the parties intended a final and binding contract, and, if
162. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1978).
163. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33(2) (1981) ("The terms of a contract are
reasonably certain if they provide a basis for... giving an appropriate remedy.").
164. But see Candid Productions, Inc. v. Int'l Skating Union, 530 F. Supp. 1330, 1334-
35 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
165. See Burton I, supra note 36, at 392 (suggesting that party who recaptures forgone
opportunity should compensate the other party to protect non-breaching party's reliance
interest); Knapp, supra note 10, at 718 (suggesting that an appropriate remedy for breach
of contract to bargain would be the "standard 'expectation remedy' "); Perillo, Restitu-
tion in a Contractual Context. 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1208, 1224 (1973) (suggesting that
where a contract is too indefinite to warrant expectation damages, courts can use restitu-
tion to restore the parties to their status quo position).
Fuller and Perdue, in their seminal article, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,
46 Yale L.J. 52 (1936), distinguished between expectation interest, reliance interest, and
restitution interest. They defined the expectation interest as giving "the promisee the
value of the expectancy which the promise created." Id. at 54. The reliance interest is
defined as serving to undo "the harm which his reliance on the defendant's promise has
caused him." Id. Preventing gain "by the defaulting promisor at the expense of the
promisee" is the restitution interest. Id.
166. Although Professor Knapp introduced the idea of an enforceable contract to bar-
gain in 1969, see Knapp, supra note 10, courts have been slow in adopting it as a separate
basis of liability. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
167. See, eg., Thompson v. Liquichimica of Am., 481 F. Supp. 365, 366 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (telephone conversation between Donald Zoeller, Esq., of counsel for defendants,
and James Shephard, the author's research assistant, on August 26, 1986 discussing set-
tlement of case).
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so, whether the terms of the "agreement in principle" are sufficiently def-
inite for a court to enforce.'68 By focusing on these issues, rather than on
whether a contract to negotiate has arisen, courts have held either that
there is no remedy because there is no liability'69 or, if they find liability,
they assume that the traditional expectation measure of damages is the
appropriate remedy. 7 o
Generally, a court holding that an "agreement in principle" consti-
tutes a binding contract under the "all or nothing" approach will give the
non-breaching party traditional contract damages.'' When the sale of a
business is involved, the typical remedies for breach of such a contract
would include either specific performance, if the business is unique and
damages could not provide an adequate remedy, 172 or damages, based on
the non-breaching party's expectation interest.
At the "agreement in principle" stage, neither of these remedies is ap-
propriate. Specific performance is inappropriate for two reasons. First,
in order to grant specific performance the contract must be sufficiently
certain to provide a basis for granting and enforcing the decree., 3 The
certainty required for specific performance is greater than the certainty
required for granting damages. 174 Thus, although the "agreement in
principle" may be sufficiently certain for a court to enforce as a contract
and to grant damages for its breach, it may not be certain enough to
168. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
169. See Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 828 (1984); United Acquisition Corp. v. Banque Paribas, 631 F. Supp. 797
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Jillicy Film Enters. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 515
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Pinnacle Books, Inc. v. Harlequin Enters., 519 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); Mocca Lounge, Inc. v. Misak, 94 A.D.2d 761, 462 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1983).
170. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
171. This result of the "all or nothing" approach was noted by Summers, supra note
36:
A judge who thinks of contract theory as the only possible basis for relief may,
in some cases, be disinclined to grant recovery for the further reason that he
thinks contract liability must inevitably be 'all or nothing' in character-liabil-
ity for full expectancy damages, or no liability at all. Such a judge will turn
away a plaintiff seeking merely reliance damages if expectancy damages would
not also be appropriate.
Id. at 258, n. 259. See also Fuller & Perdue, supra note 12, at 373-77 (criticizing judicial
disinclination to abandon the "all or nothing" approach in favor of protecting a party's
reliance interest).
As previously noted, Professor Knapp has termed this contract as a "contract to bar-
gain." Knapp, supra note 10, at 685-86. The important element to finding such a con-
tract lies in determining the extent to which both parties are committed to reaching an
agreement. In other words, to the extent that "[e]ach [party] regards withdrawal by the
other-for a reason other than failure to reach agreement on the remaining points - as
unjustified, and worthy of both moral and legal condemnation," an enforceable contract
to bargain is created. Id.
172. C. Knapp, Commercial Damages, A Guide to Remedies in Business Litigation at
38-61 (1986). See, e.g., Hogan v. Norfleet, 113 So. 2d 437, 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959);
DeBauge v. Whitsitt, 512 P.2d 487, 489 (Kans. 1973).
173. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 362 (1981).
174. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 362 comment a (1981)
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warrant a decree of specific performance. Second, specific performance
at the "agreement in principle" stage is inappropriate since the parties do
not yet expect that the transaction will close. They each realize that a
definitive agreement must still be negotiated, and if negotiations break
down over the terms of that definitive agreement, even though both par-
ties have acted in good faith, they each expect to walk away with impu-
nity. Thus, specifically enforcing the agreement would not effectuate the
parties' intentions.
The traditional measure of expectation damages is also an inappropri-
ate remedy at the "agreement in principle" stage. Expectation damages
in the sale of business context are intended to give the non-breaching
party the benefit of its bargain. This measure of damages is normally
calculated by the difference between the contract price and the fair mar-
ket value of the business on the date of breach plus incidental or special
damages provided that they are foreseeable at the time of contracting and
can be proven with reasonable certainty.' 75 These special damages might
include costs incurred in connection with a substitute transaction, 176 and,
in some cases, lost profits.17 7 At the "agreement in principle" stage, this
measure of damages overcompensates the non-breaching party. Because
neither party has any assurance that they will successfully reach a defini-
tive agreement, even if both act in good faith, the non-breaching party
should not be entitled to damages other than the harm it suffers in reli-
ance on the other party's implicit agreement to negotiate in good faith."'
A court focusing on the duty to negotiate in good faith can formulate a
remedy concentrating on the harm that the non-breaching party suffers
as a result of the breaching party's failure to negotiate in good faith. As
already suggested, courts should view the parties to an "agreement in
principle" as entering into a contract with mutual obligations. Each
party intends that it will withdraw from the market and not seek a better
deal elsewhere.'79 In the hypothetical, for example, Acquiring, by enter-
175. C. Knapp, supra note 172, at 61-30 (1986).
176. See, e.g., Wickman v. Opper, 10 Cal. Rptr. 291, 294 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
177. C. Knapp, supra note 172, at 61-30 (1986).
178. Under the traditional expectation measure of damages, the non-breaching party is
entitled to costs incurred in undertaking a substitute transaction since it would not have
incurred those costs but for the breach of the original contract. A breach of the "agree-
ment in principle" should not entitle the non-breaching party to recover costs incurred in
connection with the second transaction since, even if there had not been a breach of the
"agreement in principle," at that stage the non-breaching party has no assurance that a
definitive agreement will be reached. Thus, neither party has an assurance that it will not
have to incur costs in connection with substitute transactions if the original parties can-
not agree on a definitive agreement.
179. Withdrawal from the market is a prerequisite to the finding of an enforceable
"contract to negotiate." If the parties include a "shopping" provision in their "agree-
ment in principle" that allows one or both parties to remain in the market for an alterna-
tive deal, then that should reflect the parties' intent not to have forgone opportunities and
not to have entered into an enforceable contract to negotiate. It is essential that the
parties remain free at this stage in the transaction to conduct the negotiations along the
lines that they see fit. Thus, if they intend not to be contractually obligated to negotiate
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ing into an "agreement in principle" with Target, has forgone the oppor-
tunity of shopping around to purchase a comparable firm if that purchase
would serve as a substitute for the acquisition of Target. When a party
breaches the duty to negotiate in good faith by reentering the market and
recapturing that forgone opportunity, it should have to pay any damages
that the non-breaching party has suffered in reliance on the "agreement
in principle."
As a general principle, the non-breaching party's damages can be mea-
sured by the extent that it has been harmed by its withdrawal from the
market between the time when the parties entered into the "agreement in
principle" and when the withdrawing party terminated the negotiations
in bad faith." 0 If during this period the market changed to the detriment
of the non-breaching party, then the non-breaching party should be com-
pensated to the extent of that change. The purpose of this remedy is not
to give the non-breaching party the benefit of the bargain. Rather, it is
an attempt to return the non-breaching party, as nearly as possible, to its
status quo position at the time of the "agreement in principle."'' The
hypothetical demonstrates how damages should be calculated under this
theory. 182
in good faith and if their "agreement in principle" indicates an intent not to be bound,
courts should respect that intent.
180. For a general discussion of market damages, see Simon, A Critique of the Treat-
ment of Market Damages in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 80
(1981). As a general principle, both the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Uni-
form Commercial Code propose a market measure of damages for the breach of a sales
contract. See Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 344 & comment b (1981); U.C.C.
§§ 2-708, 2-713 (1978). Market damages in the context of both the Restatement (Second)
and the U.C.C. are seen as a way of protecting the non-breaching party's expectation
interest by permitting it to receive the benefit of its bargain. See Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 344(a) & comment b (1981); U.C.C. §§ 2-708, 2-713 (1978).
181. The goal is to protect the parties' reliance interest. See Restatement (Second) Of
Contracts § 344(b) (1981) (defining reliance interest as the "interest in being reimbursed
for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would
have been in had the contract not been made"). See also Goetz & Scott, supra note 85, at
1289 (equating reliance cost with "the opportunity cost of the promise" and measuring it
by comparing "the promisee's behavior in response to the promise with his prospective
conduct in the absence of the promise: the promisee's detrimental reliance cost is the
difference in satisfaction between these two positions"). This approach to arriving at a
remedy assumes that both parties to the "agreement in principle" withdraw from the
market. This is the "opportunity cost" of the promise. It further assumes that the parties
would not have withdrawn from the market in the absence of the promise. If the market
remains unchanged while the parties have withdrawn, then there is no detrimental reli-
ance because no opportunity costs were incurred. If, however, the market has changed,
then the opportunity cost is measured by the extent of that change because the parties
had forgone the opportunity to buy or sell during the period when the market changed.
As Goetz & Scott point out, calculating a promisee's detrimental reliance "entails identi-
fying the value of alternative opportunities forgone because of the promise and the bene-
fits retained from the actions taken in reliance." Id.
182. It should be noted that the hypothetical presents a simple transaction. The scena-
rio assumes that Target, Acquiring and Vulture are all publicly held companies each of
whose stock is traded sufficiently so that a market value for it can be readily determined.
It is also assumed that both Acquiring and Vulture contemplate buying all of Target's
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Assume that on the date that the parties entered into the "agreement
in principle" Target's stock was trading on the market at $20 per share.
At that time, Acquiring was willing to purchase those same shares for
$25 per share. Subsequently, Vulture offered Target $30 per share.'8 3
On the date that Target breached its duty to negotiate in good faith by
accepting Vulture's offer, Acquiring would be placed in its initial position
vis-a-vis the market if it could reenter the market and purchase a similar
company for the same price it had agreed to purchase Target. On the
date the "agreement in principle" was reached, Acquiring was willing
and able to buy the asset it wanted at $25 per share. On the date of
breach, that exact asset is being sold for $30 per share. In the absence of
other information concerning the market, that $30 per share selling price
should indicate that Acquiring would have to pay the equivalent of $30
per share for a comparable asset. We can thus put Acquiring in its origi-
nal position by allowing it to recover the $5 per share difference between
shares for cash. Unfortunately, the relatively simplistic situation offered in the hypotheti-
cal rarely exists other than in the pages of law reviews. Thus, courts will admittedly be
confronted with difficult determinations concerning what award, if any, should be made
to the non-breaching party. Such difficult situations occur where the sale of assets rather
than the sale of stock is contemplated, the competing bids are being made on a different
basis, i.e., where one bid was to purchase all of the shares and the competing bid was
limited to some lesser amount, and where the target entity's shares do not have a readily
ascertainable market value. For a discussion of some of the various alternative types of
stock transactions in an acquisition setting and how they can impact on whether the
transaction is fair to shareholders, see Chazen, Fairness From a Financial Point of View in
Acquisitions of Public Companies: Is "Third-Party Sale Value" the Appropriate Stan-
dard?, 36 Bus. Law. 1439 (1981). Even in situations where courts merely have to deter-
mine the value of corporate stock to determine whether shareholders received a fair price
in a merger or acquisition, the valuation determinations can be very complex. See, eg.,
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, 1241-49 (7th Cir. 1977) (court held when
market value information is available and reliable, other factors should not be used), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 940-42 (Del.
1985) (fair price involves "all relevant economic factors" of proposed merger); Wein-
berger v. U.O.P., Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713-14 (Del. 1983) (determination of fair value
based upon "all relevant factors," excluding only speculative elements of value that may
arise from the merger or the expectation of the merger). Nevertheless, by focusing on the
harm suffered by the non-breaching party during the period in which it was contractually
obligated to be out of the market, the court can try to determine the necessary values at
the relevant times. Although perhaps of little solace, the damage determinations required
here should not be significantly more difficult than similar determinations that courts are
called on to make in other situations where value has to be determined. As to the difficul-
ties involved in valuing a corporation's stock, one commentator has noted that
"[m]easuring the worth of a corporate share is a challenging and difficult task. The pro-
cess is an art for whoever attempts it and only the successful survive." Banks, Measuring
the Value of Corporate Stock, 11 Cal. W.L. Rev. I (1974).
183. As a general rule, courts consider the best measure of a stock's market value to be
contemporaneous sales or bids. See Joseph v. Sulzberger, 136 A.D. 499, 121 N.Y.S. 73
(1910). Even where the only evidence of a stock's value is from a small block sale, courts
still calculate the market value by estimating the value that would be derived from a large
block sale. See Alleghany Corp. v. James Found., Inc. 115 F. Supp. 282, 293 (S.D.N.Y.
1953), aff'd, 214 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955). On that
basis, Vulture's $30 per share offer should be the best evidence of the market value of
Target's shares and proof that the market has risen.
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its offer and Vulture's offer.184
Because Acquiring should be contractually obligated to withdraw
from the market following its "agreement in principle" with Target, Ac-
quiring has suffered damages to the extent that the amount it would have
to pay for Target rose while it was contractually obligated to be out of
the market. By allowing Acquiring to recover damages based on the $5
per share increase in the market, Acquiring is returned to the status quo
ante. Although the cost it would have to pay has increased, Acquiring
has recovered damages equal to that increase, thus permitting it to com-
pete for a substitute for Target on the same basis as before in the now
higher market.'85
184. Another theory that could justify allowing Acquiring to recover the $5 per share
difference between its offer and Vulture's offer would be that of unjust enrichment. One
could argue that Acquiring had conferred a benefit on Target by way of its $25 per share
offer, without which, in all likelihood, Target would not have received the $30 offer from
Vulture. Here, Acquiring has served as a stalking horse for Target. Target, therefore,
should have to disgorge its benefits on the principle "that a party should not be allowed to
enrich himself at the expense of another." Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d
257, 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984). See also Childress & Garamella,
The Law of Restitution and the Reliance Interest in Contract, 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 433
(1969); Dawson, Restitution Without Enrichment, 61 B.U.L. Rev. 563 (1981); Dawson,
Restitution or Damages, 20 Ohio St. L.J. 175 (1959); Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for
Breach of Contract, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 1145 (1970); Fuller & Perdue, supra note 165;
Nordstrom, Restitution on Default and Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 19
Vand. L. Rev. 1143 (1966); Perillo, Restitution in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81
Colum. L. Rev. 37 (1981).
The problem with a restitution-based approach to a remedy for a breach of the duty to
negotiate in good faith is that it is too limiting to protect a party's full reliance interest
because of the need to prove that an actual benefit was conferred on the breaching party.
See Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d 257, 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
828 (1984) (finding that plaintiff's actions "had little to do with the [benefits conferred]
during the negotiation period"). Furthermore, the restitution interest has been greatly
subsumed by the reliance interest, to the extent that the reliance interest is receiving
greater judicial protection. See Childress & Garamella, supra, at 121-22. Fuller and Per-
due suggest that the "restitution interest is merely a special case of the reliance interest,"
and that "all of the cases coming under the restitution interest will be covered by the
reliance interest." Fuller & Perdue, supra note 165 at 55. For the above reasons, it is
preferable to analyze damages for a breach of duty negotiate in good faith using a reliance
interest analysis as opposed to a restitution interest analysis.
185. The key to assuring that the application of this theory of remedies results in a
proper measure of damages lies in properly defining two elements. First, it is necessary to
properly identify the non-breaching party's status quo position. Second, it is essential
that equivalent assets be compared.
In the hypothetical, both of these elements are readily identifiable. First, Acquiring's
status quo at the time of entering into the "agreement in principle" is its availability and
willingness to purchase Target's stock for $25 per share. To the extent that the cost of a
substitute for Target has risen above $25 per share while Acquiring was contractually
obligated to be out of the market, Acquiring is entitled to recover the increase in such
cost. The most appropriate way to determine what that increased cost would be is to
look at how much more Target's shares would now cost. The best evidence of that is
Vulture's $30 per share bid.
Second, it is essential that a proper comparison of the assets being purchased be made.
In this situation, a corporation's stock is being purchased and, thus, damages should be
calculated based on changes in the price of the stock rather than the value of the corpora-
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Now assume that, instead of a rising market, the value of Target's
stock in this same time period, absent Acquiring's offer, fell to $15 per
share after the parties entered into their "agreement in principle." Ac-
quiring is more likely to breach in this situation because it may no longer
be willing to pay $25 per share to acquire Target when the stock's value
would have fallen, but for its offer, to only $15 per share."8 6 In this case,
Target is the non-breaching party that had contractually obligated itself
not to sell to, or perhaps even to negotiate with, another while negotiat-
ing with Acquiring. This remedy compensates Target and places it back
to its original position as of the date of the "agreement in principle." As
of that date, Target could have sold its shares on the market for $20 per
share. On the date of breach, it could sell its shares for $15 per share.
Target can only be put back into its original position if Acquiring is re-
quired to pay damages based on the $5 per share decrease in market
value of Target's stock between the date of the "agreement in principle"
and the date of Acquiring's breach. In effect, Target is compensated for
the harm it suffered as a result of its contractual obligation to stay out of
tion's underlying assets. Acquiring might argue, however, that it is purchasing Target
because of the value of its underlying assets. If Acquiring is planning to purchase all of
Target's stock, then it will have control over those assets and could, if it chose, liquidate
them. Their total liquidation value may exceed the total market value of the corpora-
tion's shares. This is often the case in a takeover situation and may be one reason why
the firm is the subject of a takeover.
If a contract to consummate were at issue, Acquiring could claim that it was buying
Target's shares because of the value of the underlying assets and that it should be com-
pensated based on the difference between the value of those assets and the total contract
price that Acquiring had agreed to pay. For example, if Target has 100,000 shares of
stock outstanding, then, at S30 per share, Target's total market value is S3,000,000. The
liquidation value of its assets, however, may be $6,000,000. Acquiring in this case should
only be entitled to the difference between what Vulture is paying for those shares,
$3,000,000, and what Acquiring was to pay for them, S2,500,000. Acquiring should not
receive the difference between $6,000,000 and $2,500,000 since that result would be based
on an expectancy measure of damages, i.e., it assumes that Acquiring would actually
acquire Target's shares, which is something not known at the "agreement in principle"
stage. In fact, it was the use of the expectancy analysis that resulted in the S7.53 billion
compensatory damage award in Texaco-Pennzoil. See Brief for Appellant at 76-81, Tex-
aco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., No. 01-86-00216-CV (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (No. 01-86-00216-
CV).
In the situation where Acquiring is buying assets rather than stock, the same rationale
should apply so as to limit Acquiring's damages to the difference between what those
assets would have cost on the date of breach less what it was to pay for those assets
pursuant to the terms of the "agreement in principle."
186. Despite the drop in market price of the shares absent Acquiring's offer. Acquiring
may still not want to breach. Part of Acquiring's decision concerning whether to breach
may depend on why Acquiring wants to purchase Target and why the market price
would have declined. For example, if Acquiring is purchasing Target because of some
unique quality that Target possesses, such as undervalued orange groves in Florida that
would enhance Acquiring's business, then the decline in price may not sufficiently alter
Acquiring's reason for purchasing to cause it to withdraw. On the other hand, if Acquir-
ing is purchasing Target because it has excess cash and is looking for a good investment,
and if the entire market has declined, then Acquiring may now find a more attractive
investment elsewhere.
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the market in reliance on Acquiring's agreement to negotiate in good
faith. 1
8 7
The purpose of formulating a remedy based on changes in price is to
compensate the non-breaching party to the extent that the "agreement in
principle" contractually obligated it to withdraw from the market. Such
a remedy is more in line with the expectations of the parties than are the
traditional remedies for the breach of a contract to consummate."8
In the area of corporate acquisitions, when the parties enter into an
"agreement in principle," each party recognizes that a definitive agree-
ment may never be reached because of the complicated and intricate na-
ture of such transactions.' 8 9 In most cases, however, at the "agreement
in principle" stage, absent a provision permitting "shopping" of the deal,
there is an expectation that the other party will negotiate in good faith.
This expectation normally means that the parties have agreed to with-
draw from the market. 190
To the extent that a party has withdrawn from the market in reliance
187. Initially, one might think that Target should be entitled to the difference between
the $25 per share set forth in the "agreement in principle" and the $15 per share market
price at the time of the breach of the contract to negotiate. Such reasoning would be in
line with the market measure of damages found in the Uniform Commerical Code. See
U.C.C. § 2-708(l) (1978). This results in overcompensation, however, in that it gives
Target the benefit of a bargain not yet made, and it should not yet be assumed that the
transaction will be consummated at $25 per share as there is not yet a contract to con-
summate in existence and no assurance that one will be conclusively reached.
188. As previously noted, supra notes 21-23, 95 and accompanying text, a remedy that
confers upon the plaintiff a measure of damages based upon the benefit of the bargain
results in overcompensation. This includes any remedy based upon an expectation mea-
sure of damages or specific performance. At the "agreement in principle" stage of the
transaction, the parties' agreement is as yet too indefinite to give rise to any reasonable
expectation that either party will receive the benefits that it is negotiating for under the
contract. It is this indefiniteness that often causes courts that utlilize the "all or nothing"
approach to find no enforceable contract. See Reprosystem, 727 F.2d at 265, (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984); see also Candid Prod., Inc. v. Int'l Skating Union, 530
F. Supp. 1330 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (clauses requiring good faith negotiations too vague and
indefinite to be enforced); Pinnacle Books, Inc. v. Harlequin Enters., 519 F. Supp 118
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (option provision unenforceable because terms of best efforts clause too
vague). Since the parties do expect that negotiations will be conducted in good faith,
however, a remedy protecting their reliance is within their expectations.
189. Courts that have used the "all or nothing" approach have often referred to the
complicated nature of corporate acquisition transactions as one factor for refusing to find
a binding agreement in the absence of signed, written contracts. See. e.g., Reprosystein.
727 F.2d at 257, 262-63:
The result we reach is consistent with the realities of the complex transaction at
issue .... [T]he magnitude and complexity of the deal.., not only reinforce[s]
the parties' stated intent not to be bound until written contracts were signed,
but also reflect[s] a practical business need to record all the parties' commit-
ments in definitive documents.
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984); see also United Acquisition Corp. v. Banque Paribas.
631 F. Supp. 797, 807-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
190. As previously noted, a court's primary focus should still center on the intent of
the parties. Therefore, if the parties have exhibited an intent that neither a contract to
consummate nor a contract to negotiate shall have arisen, courts should respect that
intent. See supra note 145.
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on the other party's agreement to negotiate in good faith, the non-breach-
ing party deserves protection. That reliance interest, however, should be
limited to any detrimental changes in the price of the target company.
Any measure of damages based on future profits or benefits arising from
the consummation of the transaction is unjustified because the parties
have not entered, nor have they intended to enter, into a contract to con-
summate the transaction. Additionally, such damages would require the
fact-finder to speculate as to what kind of definitive contract the parties
eventually might have negotiated.
Applying the proposed reliance type of recovery introduces a measure
of certainty to the interpretation of an "agreement in principle." On the
one hand, the parties' legitimate commercial reliance interest will be pro-
tected if they withdraw from the market. On the other hand, there is a
clear and a definite understanding of the scope of the damages. The pro-
posed solution restores the non-breaching party to its status quo position,
but avoids the egregious result to the breaching party that may stem
from awarding full expectation damages. 9 This should encourage more
parties to enter into negotiations, which should result in the consumma-
tion of more transactions, and, ultimately, will benefit shareholders.
191. One positive result of adopting the "contract to negotiate" theory is that it will
permit the party wishing to withdraw to make a rational decision as to whether breaching
the contract to negotiate is in its best interest. For example, in our hypothetical, if Vul-
ture offers S30 per share at a time when Target was contractually bound to negotiate in
good faith pursuant to an "agreement in principle" calling for $25 per share, it may still
be in the best interest of Target's shareholders to have Target breach the "agreement in
principle" and accept Vulture's offer. Although damages of S5 per share would be owing
to Acquiring, those damages generally will have to be paid by Vulture, either because it
will now be the owner of Target or perhaps because of a contractual indemnification
clause making clear that those damages will be paid by Vulture. In effect, Target's share-
holders are being paid S5 more per share than they would be under the "agreement in
principle" with Acquiring. Vulture meanwhile is probably considering that its purchase
price for those shares really amounts to $35 per share, the S30 it is paying to the Target
shareholders and the $5 it anticipates paying to Acquiring in damages. One can view this
result as requiring the Target shareholders, who in reality are receiving S30 per share for
an asset that is now commanding £35 per share from Vulture, to compensate Acquiring
for having served as a "stalking horse" which resulted in Vulture making the S30 per
share offer.
Similarly, if Target decides to withdraw from the "agreement in principle" even if
there is no competing offer, it can do so knowing that it will only cost it S5 per share to
withdraw. In the hypothetical, Target might decide to withdraw after the freeze in Flor-
ida if it determines that its shares are now worth more, or have the potential of soon
being worth more, than $30 per share, the £25 per share that Acquiring has offered plus
the S5 per share in damages Target will have to pay Acquiring.
The "all or nothing" approach prevents this type of analysis from being used. In effect.
Target (or perhaps Vulture) is forced to gamble. If a court finds the partivs have an
enforceable contract to consummate the transaction, the party liable for damages has to
fear a Texaco-Pennzoil type damages award, which could lead to its financial di,,aster. See
supra note 95. On the other hand, a finding of no liability would result In Acquinng
receiving no benefit for having served as a "stalking horse" and either Target. or Vulture
(or perhaps both in some proportion if they have divided the risk in determining the price
for the shares), would reap a windfall.
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CONCLUSION
The recent verdict in Texaco-Pennzoil, where the jury awarded over
$10 billion to Pennzoil and put Texaco on the verge of bankruptcy, is
probably the most dramatic and almost certainly the most well-publi-
cized example of the problems resulting from the confusion as to whether
an "agreement in principle" constitutes an enforceable contract. As this
Article illustrates, however, Texaco-Pennzoil is just one of many cases
where the same issue has arisen. General judicial adherence to the "all
or nothing" approach has exacerbated the confusion because parties are
uncertain whether their "agreement in principle" will be enforced as a
contract to consummate the transaction or, alternatively, whether either
party can withdraw from the transaction with impunity. As the Texaco-
Pennzoil verdict illustrates, under the current state of the law, either the
target corporation or the pursuing third-party suitor may be gambling
with its economic future, not knowing how a court will decide the en-
forceability of the "agreement in principle."
Increased judicial recognition of a contractual duty to negotiate in
good faith will help alleviate confusion over whether the "agreement in
principle" constitutes a binding and enforceable contract to consummate
the transaction. By focusing on the contract to negotiate, courts will de-
termine more accurately what the parties were trying to accomplish
when they entered into the "agreement in principle." Courts will also be
more likely to tailor a remedy for the breach of that contractual duty that
reflects the harm that the breach has caused.
Imposing a contractual duty to negotiate in good faith is not risk-free.
Courts may often face difficulties in determing whether the withdrawing
party acted in bad faith. Additionally, even using the suggested reliance
approach to damages, courts may have difficulty in determining the pre-
cise harm that the non-breaching party has suffered as a result of the
breach. Nevertheless, these difficulties should be no more significant
than the difficulties that courts frequently face when they have to apply
the good faith doctrine and make determinations of value in other
contexts.
The most significant justification for increased judicial adoption of a
contractual duty to negotiate is that courts can then accomplish their
primary goal of effectuating the parties' intent and reasonable commer-
cial expectations. Courts should carefully examine the parties' expecta-
tions at the time they entered into the "agreement in principle." If the
parties did not intend any contractual duty to arise, including a duty to
negotiate, courts should respect that intent and, in such a case, allow
either party to withdraw with impunity. If the parties did not so indicate,
however, the court should look carefully at what the parties agreed on at
the "agreement in principle" stage. It is likely that they will determine
that the parties have obligated themselves to negotiate in good faith.
Once we determine the parties' true intent, courts can and should effectu-
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ate that intent. In doing so, the parties will know that the obligation they
intended to undertake is the same one that the court will enforce.

